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THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEM WITH THE MOTIVE
RESTRICTIONS IN THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT
Carol Rice Andrews*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Rules of Professional Conduct governing lawyers once again
face a challengc" under the First Amendment. This time the problem is not
under the Speech Clause, which has confounded rulemakers so often in
the last twenty-five years,' but instead the Petition Clause. The Petition
Clause, the last provision of the First Amendment, is often overlooked:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances.'

The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to petition

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. I thank
Dean Ken Randall, the University of Alabama School of Law Foundation, and particularly the William H. Sadler Fund for their generous financial support.
1. The principal area in which state and bar association rulemakers have had to
struggle to conform to evolving First Amendment standards is in their regulation of
lawyer advertising and solicitation. In 1977, the Supreme Court held that the Speech
Clause limited a state's ability to bar lawyer advertising. See Bates v. Arizona State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The next year, the Court issued two opinions addressing
First Amendment contraints on state anti-solicitation rules. See Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar, 436 U.S. 477 (1978) (upholding state ban on in-person solicitation of private
litigation); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (invalidating Virginia's efforts to ban
written solicitation of civil rights litigation). The states and Court have been in a
"dance" ever since, as the Court further refines its application of the Speech Clause
to such rules and the states rewrite their rules to conform with the new rulings.
Compare Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., (1995) (allowing state to impose a 30-day
waiting period for written solicitation of accident victims); ALA. RULES PROF. CONDUCT 7.3 (1996 rule in response to Went For It that imposes a number of conditions, including a waiting period, on a lawyer's ability to solicit business by mail).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. 1 (emphasis added).
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extends to the third branch of government, the courts, and thus protects a
plaintiff's right to file civil claims.3 Interestingly, the Supreme Court's
first hint that the Petition Clause protected court access came in challenges to state regulation of the legal profession. 4 In the ensuing years, however, courts and scholars have tended to ignore the Petition Clause, in
favor of the corollary First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly, when examining state professional regulation. Yet, the Petition
Clause right of court access did not stagnate. The Court developed this
"new" right in other contexts, such as antitrust and labor. It is now time
to revisit lawyer regulation under the Petition Clause.
Although the petition right is related to speech, the Petition Clause
places a special value on access, 5 apart from the speech that is in the
petition. Therefore, the many limitations that the Court has allowed, under the Speech Clause, on speech in judicial settings do not necessarily
apply to the question of initial access.6 The right of court access under
the Petition Clause mandates separate analysis. I take on that challenge in
this Article. I examine, under the Petition Clause, the Professional Rules
that regulate a lawyer's or his client's motive in civil proceedings.
This Article is part of my continuing study of the right to petition
courts. In my first article, I explored the validity and scope of a right of
court access under the Petition Clause.7 I concluded that the clause does

3. See California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972) (holding that "the right of access to courts is indeed but one aspect of the
right of petition").
4. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court held that Virginia
could not apply its anti-solicitation laws to bar the NAACP from organizing civil
rights litigation: litigation "may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances." Id. at 429-30. I discuss Button infra at
notes 79-80 and 187-89.
5. The court access protected by the Petition Clause is that of the petitioner--to
file the initial civil complaint-not that of outsiders, such as the press, to observe
the proceedings. Whether the press or other interested persons have a right to observe and report on civil proceedings is an unsettled issue under the Speech and
Press Clauses. See geiterally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREE
SPEECH, § 25.11 (West 1999).
6. In the litigation setting, the Court has recognized a number of competing
interests, iacluding the litigants' right to a fair trial, that justify greater limitations on
speech thao might otherwise apply. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030
(199.) (ack.. j:. dg;r- tic:'. wer of the state to regulate attorney speech in litigation
but invalidating Nevada rule as vague). I further discuss the power of the state to
regulate speech in litigation, infra at notes 122-23.
7. Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause
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protect court access but that the right is narrow.' In my second work, I
examined the propriety of motive restrictions on court access.9 This was
a general assessment of all such restrictions, which included not only Professional Rules of Conduct but also a wide range of other laws, such as
Federal Rule. of Civil Procedure 11 and Federal Civil Rights Statutes. I
concluded that the Petition Clause overrides motive restrictions to the
extent that they limit the ability to file a civil suit based on motive alone
and not the merit of the underlying claim. Here, I narrow my focus to the
motive restrictions in the Professional Rules of Conduct for lawyers but
broaden the analysis in that I look at motive regulation of all phases of
civil litigation, not just the filing of a civil complaint.
I begin in Section I of this Article by collecting the various Professional Rules that address the motive of a lawyer or his client in litigation.
These include specific prohibitions directed to litigation as well as general
proscriptions against an attorney acting for purposes of harassment. In
Section II, I set out the Court's development of the right to petition
courts over the last thirty years. This began in the 1960s with general
references to such a right, in reaction to states' efforts to control organized group litigation through application of their professional rules, and
culminated in 1993 with a precise anti-trust immunity for judicial petitions. Finally, in Section III, I analyze the motive rules under the Petition
Clause. I conclude that the Professional Rules that impose a motive restriction on a lawyer's ability to file initial civil claims impermissibly
infringe on the client's right of court access, but those that regulate motive in other litigation activity do not.

of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999). Other
legal scholars and some courts also are beginning to more broadly test and apply the

principle. For a general overview of the cases and academic commentary assessing
the right to petition courts, see id., Section 1(B).
8. I proposed that the right to petition courts is the right of an individual or
group only to file winning civil claims that are within the particular court's jurisdiction. Id., at § III.
9. Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on Court Access: A First Amend-

ment Challenge, 61 OHIo STATE L.J._

(forthcoming 2000).
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II. THE MoTIvE RESTRICIONS IN THE RuLES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr

Lawyers are bound by a wide array of laws. These range from general criminal and civil laws, applicable to all citizens, to rules targeted to
lawyers alone. The bulk of this latter category, the specific rules regulating lawyers, are state rules of professional conduct. ° Most states model
their codes of conduct on one of the sets of standards promulgated by the
American Bar Association: either its Model Code of Professional Responsibility or its Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Both models contain
rules that purport to regulate the motives with which a lawyer may act. In
Part A of this Section, I examine the history of motive standards in professional rules, and in Part B, I collect the current motive restrictions,
those in the ABA Model Code and Model Rules, that might touch upon
civil litigation.
Before outlining these rules, I must define the term "motive restriction." Motive can play multiple roles in regulating or protecting First
Amendment freedoms. Motive can restrict exercise of First Amendment
rights if it is the sole criterion on which to base liability (e.g., a statute
that bars speech, whether true, false or opinion, if spoken with a proscribed motive). A motive or other state of mind element also can protect
First Amendment values by narrowing the circumstances under which the
government may restrict exercise of the right. A statute that punishes
speech that is both false and spoken with a proscribed motive is more
protective of speech than one that bases liability solely on the falsity of

10. Lawyers principally are subject to licensing and regulation by the states in
which they practice, but the federal government also regulates lawyer conduct in
some circumstances. Lawyers must be formally admitted to practice before a particular federal court and must comply with that court's rules of conducL Most federal
courts simply adopt the rules of conduct applicable in the state in which they sit
and some use the ABA model standards. For a listing and discussion of the approach of each federal court as of 1995, see Linda Mullinex, Multiforum Federal
Practice: Ethics and Erie, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 89 (1995). Lawmakers and academics are debating whether to develop one national set of Rules of Professional

Conduct for lawyers practicing in federal court, but it has not yet come to pass.
Compare Fred Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994)

(advocating a national code of conduct for lawyers practicing in all courts) with
Geoffrey Moulton, Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics,
82 MINN. L. REv. 73 (1997) (criticizing the federalization movement).
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the speech.
Moreover, the definition of "motive" itself is somewhat problematic. 1 I use the term here in a broad sense to include intent, purpose or
feelings. I do not use motive to mean a state of awareness of a particular
set of facts, such as the degree to which a lawyer knows that his claim
has legal or factual merit. 2 Nor do I use the term to denote a general
belief system. To illustrate these distinctions, take the case of a person
who is a racial bigot, who recklessly disregards the factual and legal
bases for his lawsuit, but who nevertheless files suit with the intent of
getting redress. He does not have an improper motive in bringing his suit,
even though his belief is racial bigotry and he would fail an awareness
standard. In this article, I focus on the professional rules that arguably restrict the conduct of lawyers in civil litigation by regulating their motive
alone.
A. History of Motive Regulation in
Civil Litigation
Regulation of the motive in litigation is a relatively modern phenomenon in this country. Today, a number of procedural rules and statutes
purport to govern the motive with which litigants act. The best example
is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b), which requires a litigant to
certify that he is not presenting a pleading, motion or other paper in fed-

11. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public:
Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993

Supreme Court Rev. 1, 5 (1993) (noting that "motive is by no means a unitary
concept, and that the First Amendment has very different implications depending on
what aspect of an actor's motive is being singled out for punishment, and what is
meant by motive").
12. The Court has distinguished degree of awareness from motive in its New
York Times line of defamation cases. In The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), the Court held that the newspaper could not be held liable in tort
for false and defamatory words written about a public figure unless the newspaper
spoke with actual malice. The Court defined actual malice, however, as being
"knowledge that [the statement] was false or . . . reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." Id. at 285. Although the actual malice standard would seem to
suggest ill will, the Court later clarified that this actual malice awareness standard
was different than "bad or corrupt motive," "personal spite," or "ill will." Beckley
Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82 & 84 (1967) (per curiam). I further
discuss New York Times and its actual malice standard, infra at notes 155-160.
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eral court for "any improper purpose."" This provision now appears in
most 4procedural compilations, but all are a product of the twentieth century.

Penalties for litigation "abuse" date back to the early beginnings of
the English court system. 5 These penalties evolved so that by the early
nineteenth century, the most common form of litigation control was an
award of costs. Courts under the English system and early American
system regularly imposed costs, and such cost awards typically turned
solely on whether the party won or lost the case. 6 If courts considered
motive, they used it as an additional factor that limited the punishment; in
other words, a losing party would not have to pay the other's costs unless
he also acted with ill motive.
Anglo-American courts also used other procedural tools to control
litigation. 7 They required litigants or their lawyers to sign pleadings,
and courts sometimes struck pleadings. However, until the twentieth
century, the signature certified the merit of the suit, not the litigant's motive. 9 Similarly, the power to strike pleadings usually turned on the
merits of the pleading (whether it was false or "scandalous") and not the
motive with which the party or his lawyer filed the pleading. In the midnineteenth century, new pleading codes began to allow a court to strike
defensive pleas if they were motivated for delay, but the courts typically
did not do so unless the pleading also lacked merit.2
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 1I(b)(l), reprinted infra at note 66.
14. See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, at § III(B)(l)(c).
15. See generally Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, § III(A). Before
the Norman conquest, English courts assumed that an unsuccessful suit was a false
suit and they made a losing plaintiff pay with the loss of his tongue. The Norman
courts substituted payments, to the King and later to the defendant, but they still
assumed that the bringing of a losing suit was a wrong. See Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical Analysis, 88 YALE LJ.
1218 (1979) (describing history of judicial methods to curb litigation abuse).
16. See John Leobsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROB. 9 (1984); Arthur Goodhart, Costs, 38
YALE L.J. 849 (1929).
17. See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, at § III(A).
18. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some
Striking Problems With Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1976).
19. The rules applicable to federal courts in equity cases, for example, required
"a signature of counsel" affirming that "there is good ground for the suit." FED.
EQuITY R. P. 24, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xli-lxx (1842).
20. See Risinger, supra note 18, at 15-16 & 28 ("There is not one reported case
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* Although procedural codes did not use motive as the sole criterion
for litigation behavior until the twentieth century, states sometimes controlled lawyer behavior through motive proscriptions. This first appeared
in lawyer oaths. Lawyer oaths have an ancient heritage." They were
early forms of "ethics codes" in that they often required lawyers to swear
to a number of ethical precepts. Many of these early oaths seemed to
speak to motive, but their exact meaning and application is open to question and merits further study.' For example, a common lawyer oath of
prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules where a finding of falsity was not required before a plea could be deemed a sham.") (emphasis in original).
21. The oaths took different forms. A particularly interesting oath dates back to
1274 France, in the time of Phillip the Bold (the different provisions, noted by date
below, were added as the centuries progressed). Remarkably, it reflects many of the
same concerns as modern ethics codes:
Advocates at the beginning of the year shall swear to the suits that will
follow. In causes which will be heard and affect the king, they themselves will advise the court of this. (Date: 1274)
Let them come early in the morning and cause their causes (or associates) to come early in the morning. Let them not propound impertinent
facts. They will not withdraw from the court as long as the magistrates
will be sitting. (Date: 1274)
They will not knowingly receive the patronage of unjust causes. If they
do not see the cause as unjust from the beginning, but rather after the
fact, they will dismiss it. (Date: 1274)
They will not propose nor sustain customs which they do not believe to
be true. In those they will not seek or enable accusations and malicious
subterfuges. (Date: 1274)
They will not speak injurious words against adverse parties or others.
(Date: 1344)
They will not be for two parties. (Date: 1536)
They will serve the poor. (Date: 1536)
They will not reveal a secret. (Date: 1816)
Lucien Alexander, Secretary, ABA Committee on the Code of Professional Ethics,
Memorandum for Use of ABA's Committee to Draft Canons of Professional Ethics,
Section V (1908) [hereinafter Alexander Memorandum] (on file with author) (quoting
Edward S. Cox-Sinclair, Law Magazine & Rev., Feb. 1908). The translation of these
oaths is rough; the original text is in Latin and French.
22. A 1785 Virginia statute set forth a particularized oath with several admoni-
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the nineteenth century required a lawyer to swear that, among other
things, he would "not encourage the commencement or continuance of a
suit from any motive of passion or interest."' Does it speak to the motive of the lawyer, his client or both? Inclusion of the "interest" language
would suggest that this is an early form of a conflicts rule and that the
oath thus speaks to the lawyer's own passions or interests that might
conflict with the client's interest or impede his professional judgment.'

lions, including that the lawyer would "delay no man for lucre or malice." See
James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seigmography, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 781, 786 n.42 (reprinting Virginia statute). Interesting, just seven years later, a
1792 Act in Virginia set forth a much shorter oath, which required lawyers to swear
only "that I will honestly demean myself in the practice of law . . . . and will in
all respects execute my office, according to the best of my abilities." Statutes At
Large of Virginia, vol. 1 (1792-1806) (reprinting Nov. 19, 1792 Act).
23. In 1908, ABA rulemakers surveyed the oaths then in effect in the states and
noted that many states used an oath similar or identical to the oath used in the
Swiss Canton of Geneva, which (as of 1908) required a lawyer to swear:
To be faithful to the republic and to the canton of Geneva;
Never to depart from the respect due to the tribunals and authorities;
Never to counsel or maintain a cause which does not appear to be just
or equitable, unless it be the defence of an accused person;
Never to employ knowingly, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to me, any means contrary to truth, and never to seek to mislead the judges by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact contrary to the honor or reputation of the parties, if it be not indispensable
to the cause with which I may be charged;
Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of a suit
from any motive or passion or interest;
Not to reject, for any considerations personal to myself, the cause of the
weak, the stranger, or the oppressed.
REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, vol. XXXI, App. B, at 715-16 (1907);
Alexander Memorandum, supra note 21, at 113 (noting states that used this oath).
24. Likewise, the colonial oath, such as that in Virginia, barring lawyers from
delaying a cause "for lucre or malice," probably spoke to the lawyer's ill motives.
See supra note 22. Colonists distrusted lawyers, as illustrated by a 1645 Virginia
statute:
whereas many troublesome suits are multiplied by the unskilfulness and
covetousness of attorneys who have more intended their own profit and
their inordinate lucre than the good and benefit of their clients, be it
therefore enacted that all mercenary attorneys be wholly expelled from
such office.
CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR, at 41 (Howard, Fertig 1966)
(reprinting 1645 Virginia statute). Warren notes that the term "mercenary" likely
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By the mid-nineteenth century, some states had statutes listing specific duties of lawyers. These statements of duties seem to be an outgrowth of the particularized oaths. The statutory duties mirrored the provisions of the detailed oaths and typically included the duty not to encourage suits out of any motive of passion or interest. ' In turn, the oath
in these states was general. The lawyer typically swore allegiance to the
constitution and other, laws and obedience to the statutory statement of
his duties.2
These early efforts would evolve into formal codes of legal ethics by
the dawn of the twentieth century. Much of this reform can be attributed
to two highly influential essays on legal ethics in the mid-nineteenth
century. These essays advocated that lawyers should do justice and act as
a screen for improper client actions. This advocacy led to the formation
of detailed ethics codes. Those ethics codes in turn seemed to have been
an essential step in the widespread adoption of bans on litigants going to
court with ill motives.

referred to any lawyer who collected a fee and did not reflect "the opprobrious
definition later given to the word." Id. n.1.
25. For example, the 1852 Alabama Code stated that the duties of lawyers were:
1. To support the Constitution and Laws of this State and the
United States.
2. To maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers.
3. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
to them, such means only as are consistent with truth; and never to
seek to mislead the judges by any artifice or false statement of the law.
4. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients.
5. To abstain from all offensive personalities, and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor reputation of a party or a witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which they are charged.
6. To encourage neither the commencement nor continuance of an
action or proceeding, from any motive of passion or interest.
7. Never to reject for any consideration personal to themselves the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed.
ALA. CODE, Title 9, ch. 10 § 73? (1852). See also Alexander Memorandum, supra
note 21, at § V (surveying lawyer oaths as of 1908).
26. The 1852 Alabama Code provided:
Every attorney, before commencing practice, must take an oath to support the constitution of this state, and of the United States, and not to
violate the duties enjoined on him by law.
ALA. CODE, Title 9, ch. 10 § 735 (1852).
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The movement began in 1836, with David Hoffman, a lecturer at the
University of Maryland. His widely read essay on "legal deportment"
urged that lawyers should be filters for their client's actions' and that
they should refrain from taking even legally meritorious positions, if the
lawyer believed them to be unjust.' As to motive, Hoffman suggested
that lawyers should not take civil cases to further either the client's, or
his own, ill purposes. His tenth resolution clearly applied to the intentions
of the client:
Should my client be disposed to insist on captious requisitions, or
frivolous and vexatious defenses, they shall be neither enforced nor
countenanced by me. And if still adhered to by him from a hope of
pressing the other party into a unjust compromise, or with any other
motive, he shall have the option to select other counsel."
Hoffman's second resolution stated that "I will espouse no man's cause
out of envy, hatred or. malice toward his antagonist."' Like the typical
lawyer oath of the day,3' this provision is ambiguous as to whose motive
is at issue, but when juxtaposed against the tenth resolution, it seemingly
addresses lawyer motive.
Judge George Sharswood picked up the campaign in 1854. While a
law professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Sharswood instructed
law students that "truth, simplicity and candor" are the "cardinal virtues"
of lawyers and that lawyers should avoid practices, such as being "hired
to abuse the opposite party," that would impugn the lawyer's character. 32
27. Professor Susan Carle describes Hoffman's views as "steeped in religious
conviction" and based on the notion that the lawyer should "do justice" and function
as a "gatekeeper." Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the
History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC'Y INQUIRY 1, 10-12 (1999).
28. DAviD HOFFMAN, FIFTY RESOLUTIONS IN REGARD To PROFESSIONAL DEPORTMENT (1836), reprinted in REPORTS OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N, vol. XXXI, App.
H (1907). Perhaps most striking was his admonition that a lawyer should not present
the defense of statute of limitations if he believes that the plaintiff's claim is otherwise good. Id. (Resolution No. 12) ("I will never plead the Statute of Limitations
when based on the mere flux of time; for if my client is conscious he owes the
debt, and has no other defense than the legal bar, he shall never make me a partner
in his knavery.").
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See supra notes 22-24.
32. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS, 118 & 169,
reprinted in REPORTS OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N, Vol. XXXII (1907). Judge Sharswood
left the academy to join the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1868 and later be-
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This admonition applied even if the law otherwise would allow the conduct. For example, Sharswood warned that "[clounsel ... are in duty
bound, to refuse to be concerned for a plaintiff in the legal pursuit of a
demand, which offends his sense of what is just and right" and that it
would be "immoral" for a lawyer to assist a client who is "aiming to
perpetuate a wrong through the means of some advantage the law may
have afforded him."33
Inspired by the teachings of Hoffman and Sharswood, the Alabama
State Bar Association enacted a formal code of legal ethics in 1887.3' It
was the first state to do so. The preamble to the Alabama Code quoted
Sharswood: "[t]here is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred
ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary
than of law."35 The Alabama Code warned that "whatever may be the
ill-feeling existing between the clients, it is unprofessional for attorneys
to partake of it in the conduct and demeanor to each other, or to suitors
in the case" and that a client "cannot demand that his attorney abuse the
opposing party.3'
Most important for this discussion was the demand that "[a]n attorney must decline in a civil cause to conduct a prosecution, when satisfied

came its Chief Justice. Id.
33. Id. at 96. Sharswood also instructed that a lawyer "may and even ought to
refuse to act under instructions from a client to defeat what he believes to be a just
claim, by insisting upon the slips of the opposite party, by sharp practice, or special
pleading." Id. at 99. Sharswood, however, was somewhat inconsistent in that he also
allowed that "counsel may take all means for [purpose of delay], which do not
involve artifice or falsehood in himself or the party." Id. at 116. He also stated that
a lawyer "is not morally responsible for the act of the party in maintaining an unjust cause." Id. at 83. This inconsistency has prompted some academic debate as to
whether Sharswood departed from Hoffman's view that a lawyer should "do justice"
and act as a screen for client conduct. See, e.g., Carle, Duty to Do Justice, supra
note 27, at n.23 (noting debate and concluding that "Sharswood comes down unequivocally in favor of recognizing'a duty to do justice"); Allison Marston, Guiding
the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics for the Alabama State Bar Association, 49
ALA. L. REv. 471, 495 (1998) (arguing that Sharwood differed from Hoffman and
advocated that the moral responsibility of lawyers was not to society but to the
client).
34. The man who drafted the Alabama Code, Judge Thomas Jones, relied heavily
on the Hoffman and Sharswood essays. See generally Marston, Guiding the Profession, supra note 33.
35. CODE OF ETHics ALABAMA STATE BAR AssOcIATION, Preamble (Dec. 14
1887), reprinted in HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETics 352-63, App. F (1953).
36. Id, at notes 27 & 28.
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that the purpose is merely to harass or injure the opposite party, or to
work oppression and wrong."37 This provision is significant in that it
clearly speaks to "purpose" and seemingly means the client's purpose.
The clause "when satisfied that" suggests a test for determining another's
purpose. A lawyer would not need to be "satisfied" of his own purpose.
Moreover, the rule apparently applies even to meritorious claims. To be
sure, it has an important "merely" limitation, but if the sole purpose of
the client were to harass the opponent, the rule would bar a lawyer from
filing even a meritorious civil case.
Another significant feature of the Alabama rule is its strict terms.
Although the Alabama Code was. often aspirational in nature, this rule
was a mandate.38 Indeed, the Alabama State Bar rejected proposals that
would have given the lawyer more leeway. The provision, as originally
drafted provided that the lawyer "may" decline the case, but the bar convention eliminated this discretion and made the decline mandatory by
changing "may" to "must decline."39 By contrast, the lawyer oaths tended to be aspirational; a similar oath admonished the lawyer merely to not
"6encourage" suits out of passion.'
The true importance of the Alabama Code may be that it prompted a
national movement to codify and particularize legal ethics. Other. states
soon began to form bar associations and enact their own codes, modeled
on the Alabama Code.4' By 1908, eleven states had legal ethics codes
containing a prohibition against taking a civil case for malicious
purposes.42 A few states had separate statutory enactments, but most of
these3 were brief and mirrored the statements of duties or oaths of of4
fice.
In 1908, the American Bar Association developed a national model

37. Id., .at note 14 (emphasis added).
38. See Molitemo, Lawyer Creeds, supra note 22, at 787-94 (discussing the
move from the aspirational notions of Hoffman and Sharswood to mandatory rules
and the Alabama Code's role in that process).
39. PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ALABAMA STATE
BAR AsSOcIATION, 19 (Montgomery, Brown Publishing Co. 1887) (The bar also

deleted other language that had required a lawyer who took a case, to avail himself
of all lawful advantages.).
40. See supra note 23.
41. See REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Vol. XXXI, App. B, at
695 (1907).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 676-78.
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ethics code." The ABA relied upon the Alabama Code and continued at
least in part the theme of lawyers acting only with the highest motives. '
The preamble to the 1908 American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics pronounced that the future of the republic depended upon
"pure and unsullied" justice and that justice "cannot be so maintained
unless the conduct and the motives of members of our profession are
such as to merit the approval of all just men." Canon 30 closely
tracked the Alabama rule against taking civil cases for improper motives
and required a lawyer to "decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a
defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure
' Like the Alabama
the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong."47
provision, this Canon seemingly spoke to the intention of the client and
would bar a lawyer from filing any civil case if his client had the requisite motive.
The widespread dissemination of the 1908 Canons, including Canon
30, may have been the catalyst for inclusion of motive barriers in the
procedural rules. In 1912, the Federal Rules of Equity Procedure included
for the first time a modest motive restriction on filing a complaint.'

44. For the committee reports and ABA proceedings concerning adoption of the
1908 Canons, see notes 21 and 41.
45. Professor Carle traces the history of the ABA Committee and the personal
background of its members and argues that the Committee engaged in an intellectual
and jurisprudential dispute as to whether lawyers had a higher calling to serve justice, above their duty to clients, and that this conflict resulted in an uncertain compromise in the Canons:
[A] clash of perspectives between these men - traceable in part to their
backgrounds but also to their unpredictable perspectives allegiances to
conflicting trends in legal thought at the turn of the century - prevented
the committee from reaching a satisfactory resolution on the duty-to-dojustice issue. The committee members instead adopted ineffectual compromise language in the Canons, leaving us with a legacy of concealed
ambivalence on the question of lawyers' 'duty to do justice' in civil
cases.
Carle, Duty to Do Justice supra note 27, at 1; see also id. at 29-31 (reporting on
the final compromise language of the committee).
46. ABA, CANONS OF ETHICS, Preamble (reprinted in REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Vol. XXXIII, at 575 (1908)).
47. Id,at Canon 30. Canon 17 continued the admonition against getting involved
in the ill will between clients, and Canon 18 added that a lawyer should "never
minister to malevolence or prejudices of his client in the trial or conduct of a
cause." Id, Canons 17 & 18.
48. Rule 24 of the 1912 rules was a successor to the earlier signature rule. See
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That limited ban spoke only to the motive of delay, but this equity rule
also evolved over time. Its modem counterpart is Federal Rule of Procedure I I(b)(1), which bars a litigant from filing any civil paper for "any
improper purpose."49
The 1908 Canons and the old state oaths and codes are now primarily historical footnotes. They have been replaced by increasingly more detailed statements of ethical standards. In 1970, the ABA replaced the
Canons with a new Model Code of Professional Responsibility.'0 In
1983, the ABA devised a new format, called the Model Rules of Professional Conduct." The majority of states today follow the Model Rules
approach, but some states continue to use the Model Code format and a
few have their own unique ethics codes. 2 In yet another effort at reform, the ABA is again looking at the Model Rules, in a project called
Ethics 2000."3 This effort is not complete, and as of the publication date
of this article, the ABA had not yet proposed any changes that might
impact the motive with which a lawyer may act in litigation.'4 I explore
in the next part, those rules in the current ABA Model Standards-the
Model Code and Model Rules-that potentially control the motive of lawyers, or their clients, in civil litigation

supra note 19 Under the 1912 rle, the signature certified not only that the paper
had "good ground to support it" but also that the paper was "not interposed for
delay." FED. EQUITY R. P. 24, 226 U.S. 629 (1912). This delay element appeared in
some predecessor codes, but such provisions applied only to defensive papers, not
claims for relief and usually applied only where the paper also lacked merit. See
Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, at § 11](A).
49. See infra note 66 (reprinting Rule l l(b)(1)).
50. The Model Code retained many of the ethical concepts of the Canons, but
reformatted the system and set forth black letter rules, the violation of which could
subject a lawyer to professional discipline. See generally Charles A. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 2.6.3 (West 1986) (describing Model Code and its adoption).
51. 1d at § 2-6-4 (describing Model Rules and their adoption). This new set of
rules was the product of a six-year "comprehensive rethinking of the ethical premises
and problems of the legal profession." ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONA. CONDUCT, Preface vii (3d ed. 1996).
52. About 40 jurisdictions have adopted the Model Rules format, but even these
states have substantial variations on the ABA model rules. STEPHEN GLLERS & ROY
SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS, 3-4 (Aspen 1999).
See generally id. (collecting significant state variations); see also infra note 60 (noting state variations).
53. The ABA maintains a website that reports on the activities of its Ethics
2000 Commission: www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.
54. Id. (status as of May, 2000).
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B. The Current Motive Restrictions in the ABA Model Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility and Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Four ABA Model Rules arguably regulate the motive with which a
lawyer may take action in civil cases: DR 7-102(A) of the Model Code
and Model Rules 3.1, 3.2 and 4.4. Interestingly, the presence of motive
restrictions in these rules is counter to the trend in regulation of lawyers.
The ABA and state bar association have tried over the years to make
ethical mandates more realistic and concrete. This effort has included
departure from some of the broadly stated lawyer-screening ideals of the
nineteenth century, including motive standards.
As I explain in more detail below, the literal language of the black
letter rules could be read to avoid use of the client's motive as the sole
criterion for litigation behavior. The rules seem to speak to effect or to
set objective standards. Yet, the rules, or in some cases their official
comments, leave open the possibility that they regulate litigation conduct
by motive or purpose alone. Whether that motive is that of the client or
of the lawyer is another source of uncertainty. We have little guidance.
Courts and disciplinary authorities rarely have invoked these particular
rules in any context, let alone to punish motive alone.55 But the absence
of disciplinary cases does not mean that the rules are free from any problem. The rules are supposed to guide the lawyer's conduct in the first
instance.6 Assuming a perfect world of ethical lawyers, none would
have transgressed the rules but many may have modified their litigation
behavior to conform to the rules, including the rules' arguable regulation
of motive.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A) of the Model Code provides that "[i]n

55. See Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991
BRIGHAM YOUNG U. L. REV. 959, 974 (1991) (noting that courts and scholars have

"paid scant attention" to the provisions of the Model Code and Model Rules, such
as Model Rule 3.1, that parallel Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
56. Indeed, the Model Rules state that they are intended in the first instance to
act as a guide and influence on lawyer behavior: "Compliance with the Rules, as
with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary
compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peers and public opinion, and finafily,
when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings." MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr, Scope '1 2. See also Carol M. Rice, The Superior Orders Defense in Legal Ethics: Sending the Wrong Message to Young Lawyers, 32
WAKE FoREST L. REV. 887 (1997) (discussing policy and practice implications, as
opposed to disciplinary results, of Model Rule 5.2(b)).
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his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or
take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously
injure another."
This standard closely tracks Canon 30 of the 1908 Canons, but unlike
Canon 30, DR 7-102(A) does not use "intent" language. Its
terms---"serve merely to harass"-suggest an effect test. Yet, the rule
seemingly could bar any action intended to harass or injure. If the client's
sole aim were to harass the opponent, it seemingly would be "obvious" to
the attorney that the filing "would serve merely to harass." To this extent,
DR 7-102(A) is broader than Canon 30. Under this reading, the Model
Code would bar a client from acting with the sole intent to harass his
opponent even if the paper were non-frivolous (as would Canon 30), but
it also would prohibit a lawyer from filing a frivolous paper if the effect
of that paper would be merely to harass, regardless of the actual intent of
his client.
Even assuming that DR 7-102(A) applies to intent, other ambiguities
remain. First, must the intent to harass be the only purpose of the suit?
Like the Alabama Code and ABA Canon 30, this rule qualifies its prohibition with the term "merely." Thus, to the extent that DR 7-102(A)
applies to the intent to harass, that intent likely must be the primary, if
not sole, motive of the pleader.' Otherwise, the paper would not serve
"merely" to harass another. Another ambiguity is whether the relevant
purpose is that of the client, the lawyer or both. The rule's references to
what a lawyer "knows" and what is "obvious" suggest a test for determining the client's purposes, and not those of the lawyer alone. If the client has good intentions and the paper is not frivolous, it would not serve
merely to harass, regardless of the lawyer's motive. In sum, although the
rule is open to a number of interpretations, a reasonable lawyer might
read DR 7-102(A) as forbidding him from filing even a meritorious motion or pleading where his client's aim is to harass the opponent.
In 1983, when the ABA issued the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, it changed the standard for filing civil papers. New Model Rule
57. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBmILrrY Disciplinary Rule 7-

102(A)(1) (1970).
58. Rules such as Federal Rule 11 do not have such a limitation. They bar a litigant from filing a pleading for "any improper purpose." See FED. R. CIV. P.

SlI(b)(1), reprinted infra at note 66.
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3.1, entitled "Meritorious Claims and Contentions," adopted a seemingly
objective "frivolous"standard:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."
Most states now use this frivolous standard of Rule 3.1, but some states,
even those using the Model Rule format generally, still use the malicious
injury-harassment standard of DR 7-102(A). 60
Despite the change in the black letter rules, some confusion surrounds whether Model Rule 3.1 is a solely objective "frivolous" standard
or whether is also retains a subjective element. The principal source of
such confusion is the official comments to Model Rule 3.1, which broadly defines "frivolous" as including improper motive:
The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a client
is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully
substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence
only by discovery. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's cause ultimately will not prevail. The
action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action
taken primarilyfor the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring
a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argu-

ment on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law.6'

59. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1999).
60. New York and Virginia, for example, still generally follow the Model Code
approach and retain their version of Model Code Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1). See
N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 22, Part 1200.33(a)(1); VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1). See generally STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS xix & 3 (1999) (reporting that as
of 1999, "about forty jurisdictions have adopted substantial portions of the Model
Rules" and that "several states, including California, New York, Oregon, and Vermont, have rejected the Model Rules" though some have included isolated portions
of the Model Rules). In addition, some states that have adopted the Model Rules
format rejected Model Rule 3.1 and retained DR 7-102(A)(1), or some variation on
it, for filing claims. Alabama is an example; the only difference is that Alabama has
made the rule's language gender neutral. ALABAMA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.1(a).
61. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. 2 (1999). Furthermore, the section of the comments that compares Rule 3.1 to DR 7-102 states:
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The italicized portion of this comment tracks the language of the Model
Code, but, unlike DR 7-102(A), this comment clearly applies to the motive or purpose of harassment (as opposed to effect) and broadens the
proscription from "merely" to "primarily." The comment also clarifies
that the motive at issue is that of the client. If the action has objective
merit and the client has good intentions, the lawyer, under this rule,
seemingly can file the suit even if his own motives are not pure.' He
may not do so if his client has ill motives.
Comments to the Model Rules are not binding authority,' but this
comment to Model Rule 3.1 at a minimum suggests that a reasonable
lawyer could read Model Rule 3.1 as imposing a motive barrier. The
history of the rule offers little to refute this interpretation of Model Rule
3.1. The stated aim of the ABA rulemakers in 1983, when they adopted
the frivolous standard, was to track contemporaneous changes in the rules
of civil procedure. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, the reporter of the ABA
Rules Commission, explained the purpose of the change: "A 'not
frivolous' standard was adopted rather than one based on the concepts
'harass' or 'maliciously injure' to track the standard generally used and

Rule 3.1 is to the same general effect as DR 7-102(A)(1), with
three qualifications. First, the test of improper conduct is changed from
"merely to harass or maliciously injure another" to the requirement that
there be "reasonable basis for" the litigation measure involved that is
"not frivolous." This includes the concept stated in DR 7-102(A)(2) that
a lawyer may advance a claim or defense unwarranted by existing law
if "it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Second, the test in Rule 3.1 is an
objective test, whereas DR 7-102(A)(1) applies only if the lawyer
'knows or when it is obvious' that the litigation is frivolous. Third,
Rule 3.1 has an exception that in a criminal case . . .
Id., Rule 3.1, Model Code Comparison. This description of the change could be read
as retaining the subjective element of the code. Under this view, the "fist" change
expanded the definition of prohibited claims to include all frivolous claims, but it
also included those brought to harass or injure. The "second" change substituted a
"should have known" standard for the former standard of actual knowledge or reckless lack of knowledge (i.e., the "obvious" clause).
62. The general conflicts rules, however, would bar the lawyer from taking the
case if his own motives were such that they materially limited his representation of
the client. See MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Rule 1.7(b) (1999).
63. The "Scope" section of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explains
that the comments "are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each
Rule is authoritative." Id. Scope '1 9.
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defined in the law of procedure." This statement of purpose is not particularly enlightening for the simple reason that the procedural rules to
which Professor Hazard refers have both subjective and objective components.
During this century, the procedural codes have experimented with
both objective and subjective components in their attempts to control
litigation abuse by parties and their lawyers.' The primary tool has been
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The original version
of Rule 11 had only subjective components, including a ban on a lawyer
filing civil papers "for delay."'67 In 1983, federal rulemakers revised the

64. ABA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDucr 119 (1987) (February 1983 statement of Professor Geoffrey Hazard, reporter for the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, before the ABA
House of Delegates).
65. See generally Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, at § II(A)(1).
66. The heart of Rule 11 is its certification provision, now set out in Rule
11(bX1):
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that
to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
wairanted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of
new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonable based on a lack of
information or belief.
67. The 1938 version of Rule 11 provided in part:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading
is not signed, or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule;
it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as
though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 308 U.S. 645, 676 (1938). See generally 5A Charles A. Wright
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rule to include an objective reasonableness standard for the merit of the
filing." They also enlarged the delay provision so that under Rule 11, a
signature now acts as a certification that the complaint is not presented
for "any improper purpose."' Almost every state in turn has adopted the
new version of Rule 11, including its broad motive prohibition."
To be sure, the portion of the 1983 revision to Rule 1 Ithat drew the
most attention was the addition of an objective standard for the merit of
the pleading. But such change was in addition to the broadening of the
improper purpose clause. Although this dual effort has caused considerable confusion as to whether Rule 11 is objective or subjective, the literal
terms of the rule state both as independent tests.7' Thus, to the extent
that Model Rule 3.1 standard was meant to track the procedural law, it
also could have a subjective "improper purpose" component.
The ABA in 1983 also promulgated other new rules that arguably
regulate the lawyer's or his client's purpose. First, ABA rulemakers isolated the delay element of DR 7-102(A)(1) and created a new rule on
delay.' Model Rule 3.2, entitled "expediting litigation," provides: "A
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with
the interests of the client." The official comments clarify that this rule
bars a lawyer from acting for the purpose of delay, even if his act does
not in fact have such effect:
Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the

& Arthur K. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 (2d ed. 1990)
(discussing judicial interpretation of the 1938 rule as imposing only a subjective
standard). Rule 11 is a successor to Rule 24 of the 1912 Federal Equity Rules,
which stated that the signature of counsel on a pleading certified, among other
things, that he did not interpose the pleading for delay, see supra note 48.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 97 F.R.D. 165, 167-68 (1983 amendments) (requiring
"reasonable inquiry" and that the pleading be "well grounded in fact" and "warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument" for change).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. l1(b). The current version of Rule 11(b) is reproduced supra
at note 66.

70. See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, at § III(B)(1)(c).
71. See id at § I(B)(1)(b).
72. DR 7-102(A)(1) instructed that an attorney may not "delay a trial" when
such action would serve merely to harass..... " See supra note 57. In addition,
DR 7-101(A)(1) had provided that a lawyer "may be punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments." ABA, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-101(A)(1) (1970).

73. Id., at Rule 3.2.

RESPONSIBmY,
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advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that
similar conduct often is tolerated by the bench and bar. The question
is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the
course of action as having some substantialpurpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper

delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.7'

The comment to Model Rule 3.2 seems to impose an objective standard for determining whether the purpose of the action was delay: would
a competent (reasonable) lawyer view the pleading or motion as having
this purpose?" Yet, it is the purpose of the pleader, not the merit of the
action or its effect, that is "the question" under Model Rule 3.2. The rule
just looks to outside evidence in determining whether such a purpose
existed. The comment also suggests that the purpose applies to both lawyer and client. Although the italicized language seems to speak to the
lawyer's purpose, the next sentence refers to the interests of the client
and seemingly brings the client into the analysis. Thus, Model Rule 3.2
arguably imposes a motive restriction on a lawyer in civil litigation
(based on his own or the client's purpose), albeit a narrow one limited to
the intent of delay alone.
The ABA also adopted in 1983 a Model Rule that demands respect
for third persons. This "respect" turns in part on the motives with which
a lawyer deals with persons. Model Rule 4.4 now provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person.7"
74. Id., Rule 3.2, cmt (emphasis added).
75. Some observers argue that an objective test likewise should govern whether a
litigant has violated the improper purpose element of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
1l(bXl). For example, William Schwarzer, a leading expert on federal procedure,
wrote an influential article concerning the 1983 version of Rule 11, in which he
argued for an objective test for purpose:
In considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper purpose,
the court need not delve into the attorney's subjective intent. The ...
surrounding circumstances should afford an adequate basis for determining whether particular papers of proceedings ... lacked any apparent
legitimate purpose.
William Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 1): A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 195-96 (1985).
76. MODEL RuLEs OF PR FwSSIONAL CoNDUcT Rule 4.4 (1999) '("Respect for
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Although this rule is not directed specifically to litigation," Model Rule
4.4 would apply to any action taken in a civil case that has as its principal purpose, the harassment of non-parties. Again, as with Rule 3.2 the
rule is ambiguous as to whose motive is at issue and seems to include the
ill aims of either client or lawyer.78 Obvious opportunities for such harassment is in civil discovery and trial examination of witnesses.
In sum, the ABA, and hence the states, have a variety of rules that
arguably regulate the motive of lawyers or their clients in civil litigation.
To be sure, bad motive alone does not appear to be the primary target of
these rules. The rules seemingly try to regulate litigation conduct in terms
of its effect. Yet, the terms of the rules are sufficiently broad that they
reach motive alone, regardless of the merit or the effect of the activity.
That the rules regulate motive of course does not by itself invalidate
the rules. Many laws turn on motive or state of mind. The questions
instead are first, whether any of the activity that these rules purport to
regulate-filing a civil complaint or other paper, other conduct of litigation, or treatment of third parties-is protected by the First Amendment
right to petition courts, and, second, whether motive is a permissible basis
on which to regulate that First Amendment right. Analysis of these questions requires an understanding of the right to petition courts.

Rights of Third Persons") (emphasis added). The ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission
has proposed additional paragraphs to Model Rule 4.4. See ABA website:

www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k. The proposed additions principally deal with privilege
and do not affect the application of the rule to potentially regulate the motive with
which a lawyer may act in litigation with regard to third parties.
77. The rule is part of Section 4 of the Model Rules format, which part is entitled '"Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients." By contrast, Section 3, which
contains both Model Rules 3.1 and 3.2 is entitled simply "Advocate." See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Table of Contents..

78. That
cial "Model
Model Rule
Model Code

the rule has potential. application to litigation is illustrated by the offiCode Comparison" that ABA included as part of the commentary to
4.4. That section cites as a source of Model Rule 4.4 sections of the
addressing litigation, including DR 7-102(A). MODEL RULES OF PROFESSiONAL CONDUCT, Rule 4.4 (Model Code Comparison). The concern about the impact
of litigation on third persons dates back to the lawyer oaths and statements of duties
under which a lawyer was not to prejudice the honor or reputation of a witness
except as necessary to do justice to the client's cause. See 1852 Alabama Code,
supra note 25. Indeed, the Ancient French Oath included such a provision in 1344.
See supra note 21.
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III. THE RIGHT TO PETITION COURTS

The Supreme Court first recognized that the Petition Clause protects
access to court in a line of cases involving state regulation of lawyers,
beginning in 1963 with NAACP v. Button." In Button, the NAACP had
urged black persons to use NAACP lawyers to bring desegregation suits
against Virginia. Virginia claimed that this activity violated its statutes
against solicitation of legal business. The Court held that the NAACP's
litigation activities were protected by the First Amendment. The Court
emphasized the rights of association and expression, but it also suggested
that the right to petition protected litigation:
[A]bstract discussion is not the only species of communication which
the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous
advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion...

In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of
resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful
objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state
and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country.
It is thus a form of political expression. Groups which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently
turn to the courts.... And under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a
minority to petition for redress of grievances.'°
In 1964, the Court applied Button to private, personal injury litigation. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,81 the union ad-

79. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
80. Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added). The Court further explained the relationship
between litigation and more traditional views of First Amendment freedoms:
We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of
cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby
Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve legitimate political ends,
subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of
speech, petition or assembly....
The NAACP is not a conventional political party; but the litigation it
assists, while serving to vindicate the legal rights of the members of the
American Negro community, at the same time and perhaps more important, makes possible the distinctive contribution of a minority group to
the ideas and beliefs of our society. For such a group, association for
litigation may be the most effective form of political association.
Id. at 430-31.
81. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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vised its injured members to consult with union-approved lawyers before
settling claims for work-related injuries, primarily claims under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.' Virginia charged that the Union's service
constituted unlawful solicitation and unauthorized practice of law. The
Court held that the service was protected First Amendment activity, primarily association but also petition and court access:
The State can no more keep these workers from using their cooperative plan to advise one another than it could use more direct means
to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal
rights. The right to petition the courts cannot be so handicapped."

Thus, the First Amendment right was not limited to political litigation."
Indeed, within the next seven years, the Court twice again applied the
right to personal injury litigation, in United Mine Workers of America,
District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association' and in United Transporta-

82. Id. at 1-5.
83. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
84. The dissent in Railroad Trainmen argued for a political limitation:
[In Button] the vital fact was that the claimed privilege was a 'form of
political expression to secure, through court action, constitutionally protected civil rights. Personal injury litigation is not a form of political
expression, but rather a procedure for the settlement of damages claims.
No guaranteed civil right is involved.
Id. at 10 (Clark, J., dissenting). The Court, however, had rejected a political limitation on First Amendment freedoms, including the right to petition, almost thirty years
earlier, in Thomas v. Collins:
This conjunction of liberties is not peculiar to religious activity and
institutions alone. The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same
security as freedom of conscience. ... Great secular causes, with small
ones, are guarded. The grievance for redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of free speech and a free press
are not confined to any field of human interest
323 U.S. 516, 530-531 (1945) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
85. 389 U.S. 217 (1967). Illinois tried to stop the UMW from hiring lawyers to
assist its members in FELA claims. The Court held that the First Amendment protects personal injury litigation:
We think that both the Button and Trainmen cases are controlling here.
The litigation in question is, of course, not bound up with political
matters of acute social moment, as in Button, but the First Amendment
does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political. 'Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was in-
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tion Union v. State Bar of Michigan."
Despite their broader view of the right, the group litigation cases did
not prompt widespread recognition or application of the right to petition
courts. Legal analysts, and even the Court itself, continued to suggest that
this new doctrine applied only where other First Amendment rights were
implicated, particularly the freedom to assemble." This narrow reading
of the right of court access is consistent with the Court's contemporaneous treatment of court access under due process." In a series of cases

sured, and with the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones.' . . . [Thomas]. And of course in Trainmen, where the litiga-

tion was as here, solely designed to compensate victims of industrial
accidents, we rejected the contention made in dissent, that the principles
announced in Button were applicable only to litigation for political purposes.
Id. at 223.
86. 401 U.S. 576 (1971). Here, the union program required counsel to limit his
fees to 25% of all FELA recovery in exchange for the union recommending his
services to its members. The Court invalidated Michigan's efforts to enjoin this union program:
The common threat [sic] running through our decisions in Button, Trainmen and United Mine Workers, is that collective activity undertaken to
obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the
protection of the First Amendment. However, that right would be a hollow promise if courts could deny associations of workers or others the
means of enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representation . . . The injunction cannot stand.

Id. at 585-86.
87. See Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335
(1985) (noting a "conceptual difficulty" in applying the union litigation cases to an
individual claim because "the First Amendment interest at stake (in the union cases]
was primarily the right to associate collectively"). I discuss Walters in more detail
infra at notes 172-83. See also David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV.
J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 293, 386 n.447 (1994) (suggesting that Button addressed only
pre-filing group organization and planning of litigation); Julie M. Spanbauer, The
First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut
from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CoNsT. LAW. Q. 43-49 (1993) (interpreting the
group litigation cases as requiring the presence of a First Amendment freedom other
than petitioning).
88. Also at the same time the Court was developing a separate right of court
access for prisoners, not applicable to ordinary citizens. The Court has suggested that
this unique right of court access rests upon both the Habeas Clause and equal protection, but it now bases this right on due process. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 579 (1974) ("The right of court access to the courts, upon which [prisoner
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beginning in 1971, the Court held that due process rarely protects a
plaintiff's right to court access.
Beginning with Boddie v. Connecticut," indigent individuals challenged the requirement that they pay filing fees in order to file a civil
complaint. The Court held that a plaintiff has no due process right of
initial court access except in extraordinary circumstances, where courts
are the only means to resolve the dispute and the matter is one of fundamental importance.' Thus, due process requires that an indigent divorce
petitioner have free access to court because marriage is a fundamental
right and because judicial decree is the only means by which to obtain a
legal divorce, 9' but does not extend any right of court access to a bankruptcy petitioner' and a person challenging an adverse welfare determination.93
The Court broke away from this trend in another line of cases, interpreting the antitrust laws, and started to develop a broader right of court
access under the Petition Clause." In 1961, in Eastern Railroad Presaccess cases were premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that
no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights"). But see Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 838-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's
declaration of a "fundamental right of access to the courts [for prisoners] . .. is
found nowhere in the Constitution").
89. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
90. Id. at 375-76 & 382-83 (stating that due process typically does not protect
"persons seeking access to the judicial process in the first instance .. .because . . .
resort to courts is not usually the only available, legitimate means of resolving private disputes" and that judicial access may be "placed beyond the reach of any
individual" unless resort to courts "is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of
a fundamental human relationship").
91. Id. at 376, 383 (holding that "marriage involves interests of basic importance
in our society" and that "a State may not consistent with the . . . Due Process
Clause . . . pre-empt the right to resolve this legal relationship without affording all
citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so").
92. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1973) (noting that an alleged
bankrupt's interest "does not rise to the same constitutional level" as the
"associational" interest in dissolving a marriage and that "a debtor . . . in theory,
,and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors").
93. Ortwein v. Schwartz, 410 U.S. 565 (1973) (per curiam) (noting that the
interest in welfare payments "has far less constitutional significance" than divorce
and that the welfare administration hearing process was an alternate form of dispute
rpsolution, thus rendering access to courts non-essential).
94. The Court discussed and developed the various doctrines of court access
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idents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.," a group of truckers
brought antitrust claims against railroads that had lobbied the governor of
Pennsylvania to veto legislation that benefitted truckers.' The railroads
allegedly lobbied the governor in order to "destroy" the truckers. 7 The
Court limited the Sherman Act so that it did not outlaw such lobbying
activity, and in doing so, the Court cited the Petition Clause: the "right of
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and we
cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these
freedoms."''
In 1972, the Court in CaliforniaMotor Transport v. Trucking Unlimiteda' extended Noerr antitrust immunity to the courts:
The same philosophy governs the approach of citizens or groups of
them to administrative agencies ...and to courts, the third branch of
the government. Certainly, the right to petition extends to all departments of the government. The right of access to the courts is indeed
but one aspect of the right of petition. °°
The Court did not explain its bases for extending the petition right to the
courts. As I explain in detail in my first article, the record is "thin" on
this issue, but the Court probably was correct. The history, policies and
text of the Petition Clause all support, in varying degrees, application of
the petition right to the courts.01 In addition, the Court has since
"strengthened" the right by recognizing and applying it in other contexts.

almost in isolation. The Court rarely mentioned the competing theories of court access. For further discussion of this anomaly, see Andrews, A Right of Court Access,
supra note 7, at § I(B).
95. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
96. Id at 129. The Sherman Act reaches lobbying activity if the petitioner intended to monopolize trade or acted collectively with others to restrain competition
through the lobbying and caused harm to competition. See Andrews, Motive Restric-

tions, supra note 9, at § III(C)(l).
97. 365 U.S. at 139.
98. 365 U.S. at 138. The Court also noted that political activity is essentially
different from the commercial activity that the Sherman Act was meant to regulate.
Id. at 137-38. See also McGowan & Lemeley, supra note 87.
99. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
100. Id. at 510 (emphasis added). The California Motor Transport pronouncement
was a dictum in that thF Court ultimately held that the defendants' adjudication
efforts were "sham" (i.e., baseless claims) and therefore not protected petitioning. i
at 510 & 513. See infra notes 129-33 and 137-40 (discussing the Court's "sham"
exception to petitioning immunity).
101. See Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra note 7, at § II.
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Of particular importance is a 1983 case in which the Court applied
petitioning immunity to the federal labor laws-Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB." ° There, an employer sued picketing employees for defamation in state court. The National Labor Relations Board found that the
employer had brought the claim in retaliation for the workers' picketing
and enjoined the employer's suit as an unfair labor practice, in violation
of the National Labor Relations Act.' 3 A unanimous Court reversed. As
in Noerr, it construed the NLRA so that it would not run afoul of the
Petition Clause:
In California Motor Transport... we recognized that the right of
access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to
petition... The right of access to a court is too important to be
called an unfair labor practice solely on the ground that what is
sought in court is to enjoin employees from exercising a protected
right [under the NLRA].'"
The NLRB could not interfere with the employer's right of access to
court if its suit met the requisite standard of merit."°
The Court's most recent statement of the right came in 1993, in
another antitrust case." In Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., ° the Court clarified its holding in California Motor Transport that certain "sham" litigation is not protected by

102. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
103. The NLRA, like the Sherman Act, is broad enough to attach to civil court
filings if done with the requisite intent and resultant harm. See Andrews, Motive
Restrictions, supra note 9, at § HI(C)(2).
104. 461 U.S. at 741. See also id. at 742-43 ("considering the First Amendment
right of access to the courts and the state interests ... we conclude [that] [t]he
filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair
labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiffs
desire to retaliate"); Id. at 751-52 (J. Brennan, concurring) (acknowledging that the
Petition Clause extended to the courts and that the narrow interpretation of the
NLRA has "constitutional resonances). I discuss Bill Johnson's Restaurants in more
detail, infra at notes 130-32 and 139-40.
105. I discuss the merit standard in detail, infra at notes 130-35 and 140.
106. In two other cases since Bill Johnsons' Restaurants, the Court has in dicta
recognized the right to petition courts. See Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984)
("The First Amendment right protected in Bill Johnson's Restaurants is plainly a
'right of access to the courts . . . for redress of alleged wrongs."'); McDonald v.
Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) ("Filing of a complaint is a from of petitioning activity.").
107. 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
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Noerr petitioning immunity."° The Court in Professional Real Estate
Investors held that, in order to constitute a "sham," and thus fall outside
of Noerr petitioning immunity, litigation must be both objectively unreasonable and made in subjective bad faith."° If the claim is objectively
reasonable, motive is irrelevant,0 the claim is not sham and its filing is
immune from antitrust liability."
This clear definition of the Noerr antitrust immunity as applied to
litigation prompted wider recognition of the right to petition courts outside of antitrust and labor suits. Many courts and commentators now take
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors as a constitutional mandate and recognize a First Amendment right of court access."' That the Court more
clearly defined Noerr immunity, however, does not mean that it defined
the right to petition courts or that the ProfessionalReal Estate Investors
test is appropriate for judging the professional rules of conduct. As I note
above, Noerr is both a constitutional mandate and an interpretation of the
antitrust laws. In the next Section, I grapple with both defining the right
to petition courts and applying that right to test the motive restrictions in
the professional rules.
IV. A PETITION CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF MOTIVE
RESTRICTIONS ON COURT ACCESS

My Petition Clause analysis of the professional restrictions on motive has three parts." ' The first step, in Part A, is to define the scope of
108. In Noerr, the Court allowed certain "sham" lobbying activity to be subject to
antitrust liability (365 U.S. at 144). California Motor Transport applied the sham
exception to judicial petitions, but defined sham litigation in a confusing manner. I
discuss this confusion infra at notes 127-33.
109. 508 U.S. at 57.
110. "Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine
the litigant's subjective motivation." Idi at 60. I discuss Professional Real Estate
Investors in more detail, infra at notes 131-33 & 138-39.
111. I collect the cases and academic literature in my previous article. See
Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra note 7, at notes 118-19.
112. I explain the structure of my analysis in more detail in my previous articles.
It roughly approximates that of the Supreme Court in assessing rules that regulate
speech,' particularly the Court's defamation cases. Admittedly, however, the proper
analysis of any constitutional right, particularly those under the First Amendment, is
a matter of debate. The Court itself is not consistent and rarely labels its analysis.
Indeed, the Court's prior assessment of motive and the exercise of First Amendment
rights, including the Right to Petition, has not followed any particular approach in
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the right to petition courts. This discussion recaps my prior efforts to
define the right: the "core" or absolute right under the Petition Clause
includes only the initial filing of a winning claim, but it is not defined by
the motive of the plaintiff. Whether the Petition Clause demands further
protection of court access is a separate question that I analyze under the
breathing room doctrine in Part C. In Part A, I discuss the parameters of
the core right and isolate potential applications of the professional rules
that touch upon that core activity.
As the second step, in Part B, I apply strict scrutiny to the professional rules, assuming their application to the core activity of filing winning claims, and conclude that the rules fail under that analysis. In the
third and last step, I analyze in Part C, under the more lenient balancing
test of the breathing room doctrines, whether the professional rules may
regulate motive in non-core activity-filing losing claims or subsequent
motions and other civil papers. I conclude that any motive restriction that
applies to meritorious claim, winning or losing, unduly chills access to
court, but that motive restraints on subsequent litigation activity are permissible.
For the most part, this discussion will replicate my prior analysis of
motive restrictions generally." 3 The professional rules, however, require
some unique analysis. Unlike court rules such as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, which govern both attorney and client behavior, the professional rules of conduct purport to regulate lawyer conduct only. By barring a lawyer from filing a claim, the rules do not directly prohibit the
client from doing so. The right under the Petition Clause is that of the
plaintiff, not the lawyer. The cause of action belongs to the client. Thus,
when we assess the professional rules, we must bear in mind that their
impact on the core right to petition is indirect, merely restricting a lawyer
from assisting the client in his efforts to gain access to court.""

testing selected motive restrictions on speech or even the right to petition. See generally Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, § IV.

113. See id.
114. This also distinguishes Petition Clause analysis from previous challenges to
the professional rules under the Speech Clause. See supra note 1. In those cases, the
Court was addressing the lawyer's right of free speech, not necessarily that of his

client. Thus, to the extent that the rules regulated speech, they direct infringed upon
the right held by the lawyer. The most obvious example is the commercial speech
cases, such as Bates, Ohralik, and Primus, involving the lawyers' efforts to advertise
or solicit clients on his own behalf. Id. In Gentile, supra note 6 where the Court
addressed the right of the lawyer to speak to the press concerning pending litigation,
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The analysis is further complicated by the related issue of whose
motive the rule purports to regulate. As I discuss in Section I, the professional rules are ambiguous as to whether they address the motive of the
client, the lawyer, or both. A rule that addresses only lawyer motive has a
different legislative purpose and effect than one that purports to control
the client's motive. Their functions may overlap (they both aim to protect
the court system, the legal profession and defendants from harm), but a
rule addressing lawyer's personal motive has a unique aim of protecting
the client from the lawyer's divided interests and potential impairment of
judgment. As we shall see this difference is crucial. Most First Amendment analyses, particularly the strict scrutiny and breathing room tests,
turn on the effect of and governmental interest behind a regulation.
A. Defining the Right to Petition Courts
Definition of the ight to petition courts is an essential first step.
This was the most controversial aspect of my previous analyses of the
right of court access. In my first article, I argued that the right was narrow: the right of an individual or group to file a winning claim within the
court's jurisdiction."' Only two elements of that right are relevant here
- the client's right to file civil complaints that state winning claims."
In my second article, I argued that a plaintiffs motive does not define his
right to petition courts. In other words, the right to petition for redress
does not necessarily mean that redress must be a motive of the plaintiff.
In this Part, I recap these three elements of my proposed definition of the
right to petition courts and isolate how the professional rules may apply

the right arguably could be attributed in part to the client. In other words, the law-

yer as the representative of the imprisoned client was speaking on behalf of the
client and exercising the client's right of speech. However, the Court did not make
this distinction and addressed the right as that of the lawyer.
115. I admit that mine is a controversial definition, but I contend that it is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, historical practice and policy. In particular, I acknowledge that the historical basis for such an interpretation is somewhat weak, but
the entire historical record concerning the right to petition, including whether the
right extends to courts at all, is thin. See Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra
note 7, at § II(A).

116. I discuss the other two elements-that the right extended both to an individual and to groups of persons and that the right extended only to claims within
the court's jurisdiction-at length in my earlier article. See id., at §§ I(A) & III
(D).
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to impact that narrow right.
1. Defining the Right to Protect Only the Initial Filing of
Claims.-First,I contend that the right of court access is one of initial
access only, the right merely to file a civil complaint, and that it does not
govern litigation procedure after the plaintiff files the complaint. This
seems to be a logical reading of the Petition Clause, which guarantees
only the right "to petition." Indeed, the Supreme Court seemingly has
adopted this view. The Court has held that the Petition Clause does not
impose any duty on the government to respond to petitions." 7 Under
this view, the right to petition courts would be one of access only and
would not impact subsequent treatment of the petition.
However, some scholars argue that the right "to petition" necessarily
includes a response to the petition and that the Court's holdings are contrary to historical practice."' This argument need not be resolved to understand the duty of courts in response to judicial petitions. To the extent
that the scholars advocate a response duty under the Petition Clause, that
duty is minimal and may require only a summary denial." 9 Due process
already requires that much and more. The Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the government to give fair
and reasonable consideration to a civil complaint once it is filed.' The

117. Minnesota State Board of Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285
(1984) ("nothing in the First Amendment or in this Courts' case law interpreting it
suggests that the rights to speak associate, and petition required government
policymakers to listen or respond to individuals' communications on public issues.").
118. See Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra note 7, at notes 268-83.
119. See supra note 87, at 51 (noting that the historical "right to petition did include both the right to present a written petition and the right to receive a response,
which, at a minimum, might be a summary denial").
120. This obligation under due process distinguishes judicial petitions from petitions to the executive or legislature, which, the Court has held, does not trigger any
due process obligation on the government to respond. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co.
v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding that due process
does not require that an individual have an opportunity to be heard on matters of
public concern: "[tjhere must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if
government is to go on"). A civil complaint, unlike a legislative petition, is a property right, that once in the hands of the government, through its court system, requires due process. See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950) (noting that the civil actions are a form of property interest and that
"there can be no doubt that at a minimum [due process] require[s] that deprivation
of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing ... ").
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Petition Clause, with its attendant heightened scrutiny, protects the initial
access, the ability to ask for justice, and due process steps in thereafter to
guard, through its reasonableness standards, the procedure used to resolve
the claim. 2'
The Speech Clause also protects the speech uttered in the litigation
process. The Court has not extended absolute protection to such speech
and in fact gives the government considerable latitude in controlling
speech in court proceedings.' The unique nature of courts and the trial
process require that the government have greater control of the process,
including the speech. These doctrines and concessions primarily are questions of protection, not definition. Speech in a courtroom is still speech. I
will discuss the appropriate standards of protection in more detail below,
in Part B. I raise the issue here only to distinguish the petition right. The

petition right is one of access and does not speak directly to either the
121. The Supreme Court explained this different level of protection afforded due
process and First Amendment freedoms, including the right to petition:
mhe preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment . . . . gives these
liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And
it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines
what standards governs the choice ...
For these reasons, any attempt to restrict those liberties must be
justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely,
but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the
remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts
might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not
suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. . . . Only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). For further discussion and application
of the "strict scrutiny" applicable to the right to petition, see infra, at

§ Im(B)(l)&(2).
122. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-33 (1984), for example,
the Court held that a court may restrain a party from publishing information gained
in civil discovery: "[a]lthough litigants do not 'surrender their First Amendment
rights at the courthouse door,' those rights may be subordinated to other interests
that arise in this setting." Regulation of speech in civil proceedings also can be
justified under the Court's public fora doctrine, under which the Court places only
reasonableness standards on governmental restriction of speech in government owned
facilities, such as courtrooms, that traditionally have not been open to the public for
open speech. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 5, ch. 8; see also McGowan &
Lemley, supra note 87, at 381-89 (discussing a doctrine and the right to petition
courts).
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speech in the petition or to its later processing."
This means that most applications of the motive restrictions in the
professional rules of conduct are not regulation of core activity protected
under the Petition Clause.'" Unquestionably, Model Rule 3.land DR 7102(A) both govern the filing of an initial claim (i.e., their express terms

123. A few other scholars have recognized this distinction between access and
later processing of claims. Norman Smith argues that the petition right is one of access only and that post-filing protection of the petitioner is a question under other
clauses of the constitution. Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .
:" An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CINN.
L. REV. 1153, 1191 (1986) (stating that "the petition clause of the first amendment
protects only the core petitioning activities-preparing and signing a written petition
and transmitting it to the government" and that "[any protection of activities beyon
this scope is derived from other constitutional rights"). Smith uses this narrow feature of the petition right to conclude that the petition right is nearly absolute, and
he argues that the Court wrongly decided cases such as McDonald (allowing defamation liability on speech in a petition, see infra note 128). As this and my previous
analyses of the right to petition courts illustrate, I agree that the right to petition is
narrow but dispute that the right is absolute. David McGowan and Mark Lemley
also argue that the Petition Clause right, applied to courts, is at most a right of
access:
inhere are vast differences between courts and other governmental bodies to which the right to petition might apply. Courts, for example, have
almost plenary power to control the actual proceedings in the
courtroom. ....
According to the Court [in California Motor Transport ], the First
Amendment grants a right of access -it gives a petitioner the right to
get insider the courthouse door. The opinion does not indicate what
level of protection is afforded to speech that takes place once the petitioner is inside ...
Once in court, plaintiff's First Amendment rights are at the mercy of
the rules of the forum ...
McGowan & Lemley, supra note 87, at 384, 385 & 389 (1994). McGowan and
Lemley argue that such a right of access "is not much of a right" and question its
impact on doctrines governing access, such as standing rules, jurisdictional limits, and
rules governing litigation process. Id. at 386-87. I disagree that the right of access is
meaningless but agree that careful consideration must be given to the meaning and
application of the right. That is the point of this and my prior articles on the right
to petition courts.
124. This definition does not, however, answer whether, under the breathing room
doctrine, the First Amendment nevertheless invalidates the rules because they come
too close to, and thus unduly chill, core activity. See supra § III(B)(3).
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apply to the bringing of a proceeding and filing of a suit, respectively)," but these two rules also regulate other civil filings. They apply to
defenses, whether raised in the answer pleading or in motions, and all
other issues and actions in civil litigation. The lesser reasonableness standard of due process, as opposed to Petition Clause strict scrutiny, governs
application of Model Rule 3.1 and DR 7-102(A) to civil papers other than
those stating claims for relief."
Model Rule 3.2 presents a similar split, although it primarily addresses activity outside of the core right. Model Rule 3.2 speaks to delay
of litigation. Delay most commonly occurs through conduct other than
the filing of a claim. To that extent, the right to petition courts would not
govern the validity of the rule. However, the rule possibly could reach
the framing or filing of a complaint. A litigant or lawyer, for example,
could act for the purpose of delay by deliberately waiting until the last
day of the limitations period to file a complaint or by separating the
complaint into several counts or multiple complaints so as to make the
litigation more complex and time-consuming. Because Model Rule 3.2
requires an attorney to expedite the litigation, he could not file a complaint or complaints for this purpose, whether it was his client's or his
own purpose.
Model Rule 4.4 presents the same dichotomy. The rule in most
applications to civil litigation would govern post-filing activity, such as
examination at trial. Nevertheless, the rule potentially limits initial access
to court. A lawyer or client might choose to frame or file a complaint
with the specific intent to "embarrass, delay, or burden a third person."
For example, they might elect to file a complaint with scandalous charges
against one person in order to embarrass a third person (the spouse, employee, political protegee, etc. of the defendant). If the lawyer's or the
client's "substantial" aim is to embarrass and burden the third party,
Model Rule 4.4 would bar filing of the complaint and thus would regulate activity governed by the First Amendment.

125. The claim need not be the original complaint. Arguably, a claim for relief in
any form is within the right to petition and would include claims in amended complaints, counter claims, cross claims and third party claims. See Andrews, A Right of
Court Access, supra note 7, at 588.
126. First Amendment principles may have some application to post-filing litigation activity. As I discuss in § III (B)(3)(b), the breathing room analysis arguably
applies to such a rule to determine whether its regulation of non-core activity-filing
motions-unduly dulls exercise of the core activity-filing a winning claim.
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2. Defining the Right to Protect Filing of Only Winning Claims.-I
also propose that the "core" or absolute right to petition courts extends
only to winning claims and does not include losing claims, even those
that had some merit when filed. A merits standard makes practical sense;
it frees the courts and other parties of the burden and harm of such
claims. Indeed, the Court already has imposed some form of "merits"
standard on speech and petitions. The Court holds that some speech, such
as false speech, is not within the First Amendment right of speech."27 In
McDonald v. Smith, 2 ' the Court imposed on petitions the same false
and defamatory standards applicable to speech; in other words, there is no
absolute right to utter false speech in petitions. In Noerr and California
Motor Transport, the Court held that "sham" petitions, whether executive
or judicial, were not within the protection of the First Amendment.'"
The problem is setting the constitutional merits standard for judicial
petitions. The Court has stated unequivocally that "baseless" litigation is
not protected by the First Amendment, but it has not consistently defined
"baseless."" The Court in Professional Real Estate Investors defined
the standard as one of objective reasonableness,13 1 and in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, it defined the test as a "win-lose" standard.' Which test

127. The Court balanced competing interests to determine that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact:"
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues. They belong to that category of utterances which "are no
essential party of any exposition of ideas," and are of such light social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1924) (citations omitted).
128. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
129. See supra notes 108-110. Even in Button, the court recognized that the First
Amendment protection of litigation extended only to litigation "of lawful ends." 71
U.S. at 429 (reprinted supra at note 80.)
130. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 743 ("Just as false statements are not
immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, baseless litigation is
not immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.")
131. See supra notes 109-110.
132. The Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants gave two tests for determining
whether a suit is protected under the First Amendment, depending on status of the
litigation. For on-going state court litigation, the Court adopted the test for summary
judgment, whether employer's law suit presents "any genuine issues of fact." If it
does, the Board may not enjoin the suit:
When a suit presents genuine factual issues, the state plaintiffs First
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did the Court intend to be the First Amendment standard?
Professional Real Estate Investors is the later case, but the Court did
not overrule Bill Johnson's Restaurants and has continued to cite it with
approval. Its lower standard therefore sets the constitutional
floor-winning versus losing claims. The different standard in Professional Real Estate Investors-for losing but non-frivolous claims-likely is
(and should be) a policy judgment as to the proper reach of the federal
antitrust laws.' As I explore in more detail in my previous articles, the
win-lose standard, though seemingly harsh, is consistent with the histori-

Amendment interest in petitioning the state court for redress of his
grievance, his interest in having the factual dispute resolved by a jury,
and the State's interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, leads us to construe the Act as not permitting the Board to usurp
the traditional fact-finding function of the state-court jury or judge.
461 U.S. at 745. However, once the state claim is concluded, the test is whether the
employer won or lost his suit:
In instances where the Board must allow the lawsuit to proceed, if the
employer's case in the state court ultimately proves meritorious and he
has judgment against the employees, the employer should also prevail
before the Board, for the filing of a meritorious law suit, even for a
retaliatory motive is not an unfair labor practice. If judgment goes
against the employer in the state court, however, or if his suit is withdrawn or is otherwise shown to be without merit, the employer has had
its day in court, the interest of the state in providing a forum for its
citizens has been vindicated, and the Board may then proceed to adjudicate the . . . unfair labor case. The employer's suit having proved
unmeritorious, the Board would be warranted in taking that fact into
account in determine whether the suit had been filed in retaliation of the
exercise of the employees' . . . rights. If a violation is found, the Board
may order the employer to reimburse the employees whom he had
wrongfully sued for their attorneys' fees and other expenses.
Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
133. Most observers do not make this distinction and assume that Professional
Real Estate Investors sets the constitutional standard. See generally Andrews, A Right
of Court Access, supra note 7, at notes 118-19 (collecting cases and commentary).
They tend to take an all or nothing approach-tfhe case is either a constitutional
mandate or entirely a question of antitrust law. I contend that part of the protection
in Professional Real Estate Investors is required under the Petition Clause and the
remainder is a policy choice. A few courts have recognized this distinction. See
United States v. Robinson, Fair Housing-Fair Lending
15,979 (P-H) (D. Conn. Jan.
26, 1995) (recognizing that Professional Real Estate Investors has both First Amendment and policy elements and taking a policy and interest balancing approach to
determine the degree of petitioning immunity available in defense to alleged violation
of the Fair Housing Act).
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cal tradition of punishing losing plaintiffs," and is softened by application of doctrines such as the breathing room and prior restraint rules."
This "win-lose" distinction by itself does not save any of the motive
restrictions in the professional rules from a First Amendment challenge.
The rules are neutral as to whether a claim is won or lost; they apply
equally to winning and losing claims."~ Nevertheless, the win-lose definition of the right to petition courts is essential to the remaining Petition
Clause analysis of the professional rules. The distinction between a winning and losing claim plays a prominent role both in determining whether
motive defines the right to petition courts and in applying strict scrutiny
and breathing room analysis. In each step, I look at the effect of the
professional rule on the core right-the filing of a winning claim (as
opposed to the effect on filing a meritorious but losing claim).
3. Defining the Right to Include Complaints Filed for Ill Motives.-The final question of definition here is whether the motive of the
plaintiff itself might take the filing outside the scope of the right to petition. In other words, if the plaintiff has an improper motive, is he filing a
petition within the meaning of the Petition Clause? As I explain below,
although there is some textual basis for this narrow reading, Court precedent as well as policy and historical practice argue for inclusion of all
winning claims within the right to petition, regardless of the motive of
the plaintiff.
First, the Court has suggested that a plaintiff's motive does not define his right to petition.'37 This is best seen in Professional Real Estate

134. See supra notes 15-16; see also Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9,
at § III(A).
135. See infra § HI(B)(3); see also Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra note

7, at § IV(D).
136. DR-7-102(A) and Model Rule 3.1 arguably would bar the filing of even a
winning complaint if the lawyer's or the client's sole or primary purpose in filing
was to harass the defendant. Model Rule 3.2 would bar the intentional framing and
filing of a complaint to create delay even if the complaint states valid winning
claims. And Model Rule 4.4 would bar the filing of a winning claim if the substantial purpose behind the filing was to embarrass or burden a non-party.
137. Likewise, the Court has held that motive is not a proper basis on which to
restrict otherwise protected speech. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53
(1988) (holding that a parody of a public figure may not be subject to civil liability
under the tort of emotional distress: "while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First
Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public debate about public fig-

20001

First Amendment and Rules of Conduct

Investors and Bill Jhnson's Restaurants. The Court in ProfessionalReal
Estate Investors held that litigation that has objective merit is protected,
regardless of the actual motive of the plaintiff:
We now outline a two-part definition of "sham" litigation. First, the
lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. If an objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to
elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an
antitrust claims premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if
challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the
litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit
conceals " an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor, through the "use [of] the government process-as opposed to the outcome of that process-as an anti-competitive weapon."
Significantly, the Court included the intent to use litigation as a weapon
as one of the motives that are irrelevant if the claim has objective merit.
Thus, so long as the underlying claim has merit, the litigation is immune
from antitrust liability regardless of the original plaintiffs intent to use
the process of litigation to inflict harm on his competitor.
This view is consistent with the Court's holding in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants.As I discuss above, Bill Johnson's Restaurants differed from
Professional Real Estate Investors in setting the standard for merit, but
both held that merit was the essential prerequisite to petitioning protection. 39 Indeed, the Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants expressly rejected the NLRB position that liability could attach based solely on the
employer's retaliatory motive in filing suit, regardless of the merit of the
underlying claim."4 Thus, Bill Johnson's Restaurants and Professional

ures"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (quoting State v. Burnham, 9 N.H.
34, 42-43 (1837)) (holding that ill motive cannot subject true speech to punishment,
at least not true speech about issues of public concern: "If upon a lawful occasion
for making a publication, he has published the truth, and no more, there is no sound
principle which can make him liable, even if he was actuated by express malice.").
138. 508 U.S. at 60-61 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

139. The standard for completed suits was whether the plaintiff won or lost, and
the standard for on-going suits was whether the suit had sufficient merit to withstand
summary judgment. See supra note 132.

140. The Court summarized the Board's position:
[T]he Board does not regard lack of merit in the employer's suit as an

The Journal of the Legal Profession

[Vol. 24:13

Real Estate Investors are in agreement that the government cannot restrict
court access based solely on plaintiff's motive.
It also is good policy to define the right to petition without regard to
motive of the plaintiff. As noted by the Court in Noerr, most petitions are
accompanied by some selfish or other "less than ideal" motive:
The right of the people to inform their government of their desires
with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly
be made to depend upon their intent in doing so. It is neither unusual
nor illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they
may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to
their competitors. ...A construction of the Sherman Act that would

disqualify people from taking a public position on matters in which
they are financially interested would thus deprive the government of
a valuable source of information and, at the same time, deprive the
people of their right to petition in the very instances in which that
right may be of the most importance to them.""
This practical reality extends to judicial petitions. Most plaintiffs bear ill
feelings toward the defendant. Society might be deprived of important
changes if the right to go to court were limited by the plaintiff's motive.
The right to petition the courts is perhaps most important when the parties are hostile to each other. Indeed, one of the primary policy bases for

independent element of the Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(4) unfair labor practice. Rather, it asserts that the only essential element of a violation is
retaliatory motive.
461 U.S. at 740. The Court explained the relationship of motive and the right to
petition courts:
In California Motor Transport, we recognized that the right of access to
the court is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Accordingly, we construed the
antitrust laws as not prohibiting the filing of a lawsuit, regardless of the
plaintiff's anticompetitive intent or purpose in doing so, unless the suit
was a "mere sham" filed for harassment purposes. We should be sensitive to these First Amendment values in construing the NLRA in the
present context. . . The right of access to a court is too important to
be called an unfair labor practice solely on the ground that what is
sought in court is to enjoin employees from exercising a protected right.
Id. at 741. See also id at 743 ("The filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been
commenced but for the plaintiff's desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected by the Act.").

141. 365 U.S. at 139.
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extending the right to petition to the courts assumes that such hostility.
The ability to petition the government is a potential alternative to force.
Moreover, a core precept of the First Amendment is freedom of
thought. Use of motive to limit the right to petition courts would undermine that goal. 42 Today, society might applaud a plaintiff who wants to
destroy the Ku Klux Klan or the big tobacco companies through the
filing of a winning claim and frown upon plaintiffs who have the same
intentions with regard to an hourly wage earner or a political protester.
Society in a different time or place might have another view. The availability of the courts to hear winning claims should not turn on popularity
contests and mood swings.
Finally, use of motive to restrict court access is not mandated by
historical practice.'43 Courts traditionally tied access to merit, not motive alone.'" Motive barriers that directly restricted the client himself
142. Unlike use of the speaker's state of mind as an awareness standard to put
the speaker in control of his First Amendment rights, this use of motive limits the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms and raises the specter of thought control.
Professor Tribe analyzes these different functions of motive and their implications on
the First Amendment in his essay on public and private motives. See Tribe, The
Mystery of Motive, supra note 11. He concludes that government may use motive to
define what facts the actor knows and what he perceives about his injury, but not to
regulate his beliefs:
[E]ven this justification for inquiring into motive stops short of a general invitation to unearth the inner belief systems that give to particular
facts their motivating effect for . . . actors. It is true that, in relatively
rare circumstances, one might be able to justify focusing on these belief
systems in the private context as the only practical way of distinguishing
isolated violations from violations that are likely to recur, and that one
may thus be able to justify a differential response, on grounds of deterrence, to private acts motivated by different underlying beliefs. But few
rights, if any turn on the beliefs or values that make various perception
count for the people who act on them. On the contrary, one of the
presumptive rights people . . . have under our constitutional system is
that their values and beliefs ordinarily should not define what they are
permitted to do, or shape the consequences that attach to how they
choose to act.
l at 35-36.
143. The practice likely was the same for judicial petitions presented to legislative
bodies. In England and colonial America, when legislatures heard judicial petitions,
they generally followed court practice. See Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra
note 7, at notes 352-54.
144. See infra, § I(A); see generally Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9,
at § 1I(A).
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from filing a civil claim did not appear in the procedural codes until the
twentieth century. To be sure, some very early lawyer oaths-those predating the Petition Clause-may have denied lawyer assistance based on
motive,145 but those limitations do not necessarily define the petition
right. First, the limitation only denied lawyer assistance, not the litigant's
access to courts. Lawyer assistance may be essential today, but it was not
in colonial America. Colonial petitioners and litigants regularly represented themselves." Second, the motive limitations in these early oaths apparently applied to the lawyer's personal motive. If this is true, a limitation on one particular lawyer, due to his personal ill motives, did not act
as a significant obstacle even to a petitioner who desired assistance of
counsel because he could retain another lawyer.
Perhaps the only argument for using motive to define the right to
petition is textual, defining the word "for" in the Petition Clause to mean
the petitioner's intent." 7 In other words, if a plaintiff does not genuinely
seek relief from his claim, regardless of its merit, he arguably does not
petition "for redress for grievances." " To put the argument in terms of
DR 7-102(A), if an action is filed "merely" to harass or maliciously injure another, it arguably is not filed "for redress of grievances."
I reject this reading of the Petition Clause. First, the argument extends only to a very specific motive or state of mind of the client-plaintiff-the absence of his personal intent to obtain a judgment. If a plaintiff
does not actually want relief, his claim (no matter how meritorious) arguably is not a petition "for" redress of grievances, but if he wants relief
and acts out of some other ill motive (to harass the defendant), his claim
nevertheless is "for" redress. For the same reasons, the lawyer's motive
does not define the client's right to petition. Even if the lawyer has an il
motive (he wants to harass a political opponent), the petition is still for
redress of the client's grievances.

145. See supra notes 22-23.
146. See generally WARREN, supra note 24, at 1 (discussing colonial practice).
Indeed, Charles Warren entitles the introduction to his history of American lawyers,
'Law Without Lawyers."
147. A late eighteenth century dictionary defines the word "for" as meaning,
among other things "for the reason," or in other words purpose. SAMUEL JOHNSON'S
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1784).

148. The Court suggested this narrow reading of the Petition Clause in its definition of sham petitions in Noerr, by excluding from petitioning immunity certain
"sham" petitions that were not genuinely aimed at influencing governmental action.

365 U.S. at 144.
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Second, the narrow interpretation of "for" is not the only possible
reading of the Petition Clause. "For" could be descriptive, in the sense
that it distinguishes one form of petition from another-those that request
relief and those that do not. 49 A complaint that states a winning claim
certainly requests relief, regardless of whether the plaintiff actually wants
or expects that relief. In terms of DR 7-102(A), a claim filed to harass
nevertheless is a request for redress. Indeed, that the plaintiff has requested relief is essential to achieve the harassment effect. If the complaint did
not request relief, it would be dismissed and would have minimal effect
on the defendant.
Policy and history also argue against excluding even the rare case
where the plaintiff does not desire relief. By my definition of the right to
petition courts, we must assume that the complaint states a winning
claim. Winning claims inform the government of problems, advance the
law, and help others even if the plaintiff himself wants to use the prosecution of his winning claim to harass the defendant. Courts historically
were as indifferent to this motive as they were to other ill motives of the
plaintiff. Indeed, the tort of abuse of process, which is aimed at the improper use of process, is a relatively modern creation."5° Even today,
application of the tort of abuse of process to the filing of an otherwise
meritorious lawsuit is not universally accepted. 5' In sum, a plaintiff's
(or his lawyer's) bad motive in filing a civil action, so long as the suit
states a winning claim, does not take the claim outside the First Amendment.

149. The 1784 dictionary lists "with respect to" as an alternative meaning of the
word "for." SAMUEL JOHNSON, supra note 147.
150. Professor Prosser credits the 1848 English case of Grainger v. Hill as the
origin of the tort of abuse of process. W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PRossER &
KEETON ON TORTS, § 121, at 897 (5th Ed. 1984). The Grainger court described the
new tort:
This is an action for abusing the process of the law, by applying it to
extort property from the Plaintiff, and not an action for a malicious
arrest or malicious prosecution, in order to support which action the
termination of the previous proceeding must be proved, and the absence
of reasonable and probable cause be alleged as well as proved.
Grainger v. Hill, 132 Eng. Rep. 769, 773 (1838). See also id. at (stating that "[t]his
is a case primc impressionis [first impression]"); Jacobsen v. Garzo, 542 A.2d 265,
267 (Vt. 1988) (noting that "[t]he tort of abuse of process first appeared in Grainger
v.Hill').
151. See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, at § III (B)(4).
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B. Protecting the Right to Petition Courts
Definition of the right does not end the analysis. Whether the Professional Rules impermissibly infringe upon rights protected by the First
Amendment depends on the protection extended to the right. The proper
level of protection due any constitutional right often is a difficult question, but protection of First Amendment rights, in particular, has confounded the courts and generated extensive debate. Further compounding
the problem is the fact that the Petition Clause right of court access is a
new and untested right. As I discuss in more detail in my other articles, I
advocate use of the general principles applicable to speech but urge that
they be refined to fit the question of court access. I primarily rely on two
basic doctrines of protection: strict scrutiny analysis and the breathing
room doctrine. I apply those here to test the Rules of Professional Conduct that regulate motive in civil litigation.
1. Standards of Protection.-Understrict scrutiny, the government
may regulate exercise of the right to petition courts so long as the regulation passes two prongs of analysis. 2 First, the government must have a
compelling interest in imposing its restriction. Second, the regulation
must restrict no more First Amendment activity than necessary to achieve
that aim. Unfortunately, the process of strict scrutiny is somewhat muddled. Strict scrutiny means different things to different people. Courts and
observers are not in agreement as to the proper test for or circumstances
requiring strict scrutiny, as opposed to a "lesser" form of review, or, on
the other extreme, absolute protection."3 In addition, the proper focus
of each prong may vary from case to case. For example, in assessing
whether civil rights laws impermissibly infringe the right of association,
the Court variously has considered the degree of impact of the law under
both prongs of strict scrutiny."5 ' Nevertheless, generally speaking, strict
152. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-44 (1963) (describing and applying the strict scrutiny test applicable to First Amendment freedoms); see also Thomas v. Collins, (quoted supra at note 121). By contrast, protection of due process
requires only that the state reasonably aim-not narrowly tailor-its regulation to

achieve a legitimate state object-not necessarily a compelling state interest. See
Jones v. Union Guano, 264 U.S. 171,181 (1924) (holding that a court will not inval-

idate a precondition to filing suit under due process if "the condition imposes his a
reasonable relation to a legitimate object") (emphasis added).
153. See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, at

154. See infra at notes 170-71.

§§

IV(A) & IV(C)(2).
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scrutiny is a demanding test and has two essential elements-a compelling governmental interest aim and a narrowly drafted statute.
Whereas strict scrutiny focuses on laws that regulate core rights, the
breathing room doctrine looks at laws that regulate related activity, on the
periphery of the core right, to determine whether the laws unduly chill
exercise of the core right. The breathing room concept comes from the
Court's speech cases. It is best seen in the New York Times line of defamation cases, but it also is reflected by other speech standards such as the
prior restraint rule and the vagueness doctrine. Under New York
Times,155 a speaker of false speech cannot be liable for defamation unless he spoke with actual malice or reckless disregard for the falsity of
his statement." Though false speech is not within the absolute speech
right of the First Amendment, this narrow class of false speech nevertheless gets some protection in order to avoid chilling the expression of true
speech about important issues."7
Whether speech merits "breathing room" depends on the relative
interests at stake and can take different forms. In Gertz v. Welch, the
Court refused to extend the protection of the actual malice standard to
persons who defamed private persons, as opposed to public figures.'58

155. The New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
156. The Court summarized this standard:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal Rule that prohibits a public official form recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the state
was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court also imposed an additional protection in New York
Times; it required that the defamation plaintiff prove actual malice under a higher
standard of proof-clear and convincing evidence---than the usual preponderance of
evidence standard applicable in civil cases, Id. at 285.
157. It is important to note, however, that this actual malice standard is not a
motive restriction like those at issue in this article. The actual malice standard is not
a test of ill will but is instead an awareness standard. See supra note 12. It specifies the degree to which the speaker must appreciate the falsity of his speech. Moreover, it is an additional protection of speech. To be liable under New York Times,
the speaker's statement must not only be false (and otherwise defamatory), but the
speaker also must actually know, or recklessly disregard, that it is false.
158. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 334 & 342 (1974). The "breathing room" terminology comes from Gertz: "[W]e have been especially anxious to assure to the
freedoms of speech and press that 'breathing space essential to their fruitful exercise.' To that end this Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood." Id. at 342.
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The potential for defamation liability based solely on negligent speech
certainly would have a chilling effect on that speech, but the Court tolerated this deterrent effect. It did so because the speech at issue was not as
important as speech about public figures and because the state interest in
protecting a private person is greater than for the public official. 9 Yet,
the Gertz Court gave some breathing room to such speech but in another
form: it forbid the imposition of presumed or punitive damages."
These harsh penalties unduly deterred speech.
Other doctrines reflect the concern about chilling exercise of First
Amendment freedoms. For example, just as the Gertz Court expressed
concern about harsh penalties, the prior restraint rule looks with disfavor
on governmental restraint, as opposed to subsequent punishment, of
speech. 6' The rule presumes that it is better to allow even improper
speech than to restrain the speaker from ever uttering the speech. If the
speech is not protected (e.g., false and defamatory), the appropriate remedy is later imposition of civil damages, not prior restraint. 62
The Court similarly protects speech through the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines 63 and demands specificity in laws so that persons
have fair notice as to prohibited conduct' and invalidates laws that

159. See id. at 344-46.
160. See id. at 348-50 ("The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award
damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system
of liability for defamatory falsehoods to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First
Amendment freedoms.") The Court later refined this aspect of breathing room by
holding that presumed and punitive damages could be awarded if the speech concerned purely privates and persons. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) ("In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a showing of actual
malice.").
161. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW supra,
§16.16, at 1020 (5th ed. 1995) ("Punishment of speech, after it has occurred, chills
free expression. Prior restraint freezes free speech.").
162. See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); see
generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ch. 15
(West 1998).
163. City of Chicago v. Morales, No. 97-1121, 1999 WL 373152, at *2 (June 10,
1999) (rejecting an overbreadth attack on an anti-loitering ordinance but ruling that
the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague).
164. The vagueness concern applies to all statutes and is a question of due process: does the statute put a person on notice of what behavior is permissible and
what is outlawed? See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)
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reach too widely and regulate both conduct within the state's police powers and the exercise of First Amendment freedoms." A poorly written
or broad statute might survive judicial scrutiny if it merely regulates nonprotected activity, but such failings are not tolerated when they impede
exercise of First Amendment rights. First Amendment freedoms are too
precious to risk this chilling effect.
Whether these breathing room concepts neccesarily apply to Petition
Clause cases is open to question. The Court has suggested that the doctrines will apply. In McDonald v. Smith," the Court applied the New
York Times "actual malice" standard to defamatory speech in petitions,
and the Court's decision in Bill Johnson's Restaurants reflects the concerns of the breathing room doctrine and the hostility toward prior restraints." n o
v. Collins, the court stated that strict scrutiny will
apply to protect the right to petition.'"
We must proceed cautiously and not blindly apply these speech

("a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application violates the first essential of due process of law"). The Court,
however, has warned that statutes touching on First Amendment rights, including the
right to petition, must be stated with "narrow specificity" in order to avoid chilling
exercise of those rights:
[S]tandards of statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression . . . . mhe danger [is] tolerating, in the area of First Amendment
freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and
improper application. . . . These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as
well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions . . . Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to
survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.
Button, 371 U.S. at 432-33 (citations omitted). See also Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (noting that "where a vague statute abuts upon
sensitive areas of basis First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise
of those freedoms") (citations and quotations omitted).
165. Not just any potential improper application will invalidate a statute that otherwise properly reaches activity within the police power of government. The test is
whether the statute substantially burdens protected activity. See Gentile v. State Bar
of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1077 (1991) ("The 'overbreadth doctrine' applies if an
enactment 'prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.' To be unconstitutional, overbreadth must be substantial.") (citations omitted).
166. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
167. See Andrews, Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, § IV(C)(3)(b).
168. Supra notes 84 and 121.
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holdings to petition cases. The breathing room doctrines by definition
require a close examination of the relative interests at stake and the impact of the government regulation on the core First Amendment right.
The interests at stake in a judicial access case are usually different than
those at issue in a speech case. For example, the defamation distinctions
between public and private speech likely are not appropriate for judging
court access, in part because all civil lawsuits involve matters of public
concern. Instead, the fundamental factors-effect of the statute and the
relative interests-better determine the degree and type of breathing room
necessary to protect the ability to file winning claims.
Another fundamental question here is whether strict scrutiny applies
at all, or, does the entire analysis come under the various breathing room
doctrines. As I discuss in the previous Part, the professional rules regulate
the lawyer's ability to file a winning claim on behalf of his client, if he
or his client has the proscribed ill motive. In theory, even if the prohibition applies, the client is free to file the suit on his own, without the assistance of a lawyer. Yet, the prohibition unquestionably impacts the
client. A typical plaintiff would be impeded, if not completely thwarted,
in his attempt to gain access to court if he could not use the services of a
lawyer.
This fact-that the rules do not directly regulate the protected right
but instead only indirectly impede or deter exercise of the right-suggests
breathing room analysis. Breathing room analysis looks to whether laws
that touch the periphery of core rights unduly deter exercise of the core
right (i.e., does civil liability for false and defamatory speech unduly chill
true speech?). But the application at issue here is not the typical breathing
room case, because to the extent that the professional rules regulate access to court at all, they impact winning and losing claims alike. By
contrast, a rule imposing civil liability on false speech punishes only false
speech. It might deter true speech, but it would not directly punish true
speech.
The effect of the Professional Rules on the ability to petition courts
might be better considered as an issue of the degree of intrusion. If the
impact on the core right is significant, it is an infringement that must pass
strict scrutiny analysis. The Court suggested a degree of intrusion test in
analyzing whether civil rights laws impermissibly infringe upon the right
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of association.' In cases such as Roberts v. United States Jaycees,"'0
the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny and, in doing so, emphasized
the degree of intrusion that the law had on the exercise of the core rights
protected by the First Amendment.'
Significantly, the Court also
hinted at a degree of intrusion approach in an adjudicatory right to petition case-Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors.'17
Admittedly, the proper analysis of such a claim is anything but clear in
Walters: the 1985 opinion is confusing and seems to undermine, rather
than apply, the Petition Clause right of court access. Nevertheless, its
approach is at least consistent with a degree of intrusion test for application of strict scrutiny.
In Walters, individuals and groups of veterans challenged the constitutionality of a statute that set a maximum $10 fee that veterans could
pay attorneys in Veteran's Administration claims proceedings. Their
principal challenge was under due process, but the veterans also claimed
that the fee limit violated their First Amendment right of "meaningful
access to court" as established by cases such as United Mine Workers of
America and Railroad Trainmen.' The Court rejected the challenge.
The Court first questioned whether the First Amendment right at stake in
United Mine Workers of America and Railroad Trainmen extends to
individuals, as opposed to merely groups and associations of people. 4
169. I discuss these cases in more detail in my previous article. See Andrews,
Motive Restrictions, supra note 9, at § IV (C)(2).
170. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
171. To be sure, the proper role of a degree of intrusion test is not clear in the
Court's opinions. It may not be a test for application of strict scrutiny, but instead a
factor in that analysis. The Court in Roberts suggested that the degree of intrusion
fell under the second prong of strict scrutiny - whether the regulation was narrowly
tailored. However, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bi-sexual Group, 515
U.S. 557 (1995), it also suggested that it was relevant both to the first prong--the
state interest in regulating the activity--and to whether the First Amendment right
was implicated. Il at 578-79.
172. 473 U.S. 305 (1985). Walters involved access to an administration claims
process and not courts. The Court in California Motor Transport extended the right
to adjudication generally, including administrative proceedings. See supra note 100.
Whether the right of access to administrative judicial process has the same parameters of the right of court access is beyond the scope of the article.
173. 473 U.S. at 334.
174. The Court stated:
There are numerous conceptual difficulties with extending the cited cases
[UMW and Railroad Trainmen] to cover the situation here; for example,
those cases involved the rights of unions and union members to retain
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Then, putting aside that fundamental question, the Court dismissed the
First Amendment claim as having "no independent significance."'" The
Court held that the "First Amendment interest would attach only in the
absence of a meaningful alternative" and concluded that the First
Amendment claim raised the same issue as due process analysis: whether
17 6
"the process allows the claimant to make a meaningful presentation."
The Court's statements regarding the First Amendment right of court
access are unfortunate. First, the Court failed to recognize that just two
years before, in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, it had applied the Petition
Clause to an individual plaintiff (as opposed to a group or association). 77 Second, the Court did not fully acknowledge that the First
Amendment right of court access is a right distinct from that under due
process. The Court's use of due process tests and terminology to answer
a First Amendment challenge might suggest that the Petition Clause right
of initial court access is as weak as that under due process-available
only when fundamental rights are at stake and when courts are the only
means of resolving a dispute.17 8 This conclusion is belied by the Court's
treatment of the right in cases such as Bill Johnson's Restaurants and
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors.
Although the language of Walters is flawed, its test and holding may
not be. Much of the issue in Walters was in fact a question under due
process. The fee cap provision applied not only to attorney assistance in
filing the initial claim but also to the processing of the claim. As I explain above, the Petition Clause reaches only the filing of the claim, not
its subsequent resolution. The claim processing standards generally are
due process issues.

or recommend counsel for proceedings where counsel were allowed to
appear, and the First Amendment interest at stake was primarily the
right to associate collectively for the common good. IN contrast, here
the asserted First Amendment interest is primarily the individual interest
in best prosecuting a claim, and the limitation challenged applies acrossthe-board to individuals and organizations alike.
I at 334-35.
175. Id. at 335.
176. Id. at 335; see also id. ("appellees' First Amendment arguments, at base, are
really inseparable for their due process claims").
177. See supra notes 102-04. In addition, in my first article, I discuss the textual,
historical and policy bases for applying the right to petition courts to individuals. See
Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra note 7, at § II(A).
178. See infra notes 89-93; see also Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra
note 7, at § IV.
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However, even as to the question of initial access, Walters could be
read as setting a standard for determining whether that right of access is
implicated. If under the regulation, the claimant has a "meaningful alternative" in presenting his claim, the regulation does not rise to the level of
an infringement of the First Amendment right of access and therefore
does not require strict scrutiny. 79 On the other hand, if the regulation
deprives him of meaningful access, the law fails unless it survives strict
scrutiny (i.e., the government has a significant interest in regulating access and has narrowly tailored the law). To be sure, the Court never
announced this latter point. It did not have to do so because it concluded
that the VA claimants had a meaningful opportunity to file present their
claim. Arguably, the need for strict scrutiny never arose.
The Professional Rules at issue here do not allow us to avoid strict
scrutiny. In holding that the VA fee limit did not deprive claimants of
meaningful access, the Walters Court relied upon the special nature of the
administrative process at issue. Unlike the typical court system, the VA
process was "not designed to operate adversarilly."''
Even without a
lawyer, the claimant had meaningful access to present his grievance. Of
particular importance to the question of initial access, as opposed to later
processing of the claim, were the narrow breadth of the issues at stake in
each claim, 8 the claimant's ability to gain access merely by completing

179. 473 U.S. at 335 (the "First Amendment interest would attach only in the
absence of a 'meaningful alternative')
180. Id.at 333. The Court explained:
While counsel may well be needed to respond to opposing counsel or
other form of adversary in a trial-type proceeding, where as here no
such adversary appears, and in addition a claimant or recipient is provided with substitute safeguards such as a competent representative, a
decisionmaker whose duty it is to aid the claimant, and significant concession with respect to the claimant's burden of proof, the need for
counsel is considerably diminished.
Id. at 333-34. The Court also noted that the underlying interest at stake in Walters
was not of fundamental importance; it distinguished the VA benefits, which were not
granted on the basis of need, from welfare payments upon which recipients depend
for their daily subsistence. Id at 332-34. This aspect of Walters replicates the
Court's holdings in the due process court access cases in which it invalidated filing
fees only in matters of "fundamental importance." Yet, even in those cases, the
Court's primary emphasis was on the availability of another means, such as private
negotiation, to resolve the dispute outside of court. See supra at notes 89-93.
181. See id. at 306.
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a form supplied by the VA" and the availability of "trained service
agents, free of charge, to assist claimants in developing and presenting
their claims."' These unique features of the VA claim system protected the claimant's First Amendment right of access, even in absence of
lawyer assistance.
The typical court system does not offer these alternatives. Courts do
not give plaintiffs simple forms that can state every civil case. The range
of potential legal and factual issues is too great. The courts do not provide free assistance of lawyers or other specialists to help plaintiffs develop and present their claims. Indeed, the court system is the base system
to which the Court contrasted the VA process in Walters. It is one in
which the assistance of lawyers makes a "meaningful" difference. Thus, a
rule that bars all assistance of a lawyer in identifying, investigating and
presenting a claim significantly intrudes upon the right to present that
claim. This is not to say that the failure of the government to affirmatively provide counsel in civil cases is itself an infringement of the First
Amendment right of court access, only that a law affirmatively banning
assistance of a lawyer is a significant enough intrusion to require strict
scrutiny of that law.
2. Strict Scrutiny of the Professional Rules' Motive Restrictions on
Winning Claims .- The first step under strict scrutiny is identification of
the governmental interest behind the regulation. Why does the state prohibit lawyer assistance in presenting a winning claim-and thereby limit
court access-where the client or the lawyer has an ill motive? The government may have any number of reasons or aims. One is to deter frivolous lawsuits. Deterrence of baseless litigation serves several interests that
likely are "compelling." As noted by the Court in United States v.
Harriss'" (a Petition Clause challenge to federal restrictions on lobbying), the government has a "vital" interest in ensuring that the voices of
all of the people are not drowned out by some of the people." Likewise, the government has a similar interest in ensuring that the limited
resources of the courts are not consumed by frivolous claims and that the

182. See id at 309.
183. Id at 311.
184. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
185. Id at 625 (stating that Congress had a "vital national interest" in regulating
lobbying to prevent the voice of the people from otherwise being "drowned out by
the voice of special interest groups").

2000]

First Amendment and Rules of Conduct

persons with meritorious claims have access to court.
Even taxpayers who do not themselves need access to court pay a
high cost when plaintiffs file frivolous suits. Taxpayers must build court
houses, hire judges and court staff, and otherwise process every claim,
but they do not get value in return if the claim is baseless. Frivolous
claims also hurt the defendant. He suffers injury to his reputation and the
high cost, in terms of time, money and other resources, of defending a
suit. In short, the government likely has compelling interests in stopping
or deterring frivolous claims.
This conclusion does not end the analysis. The restriction must pass
the second prong of the strict scrutiny test. That is the problem here.
Motive restrictions are not narrowly tailored to achieve the end of avoiding frivolous claims. To be sure, motive restrictions penalize some frivolous lawsuits. Many improperly motivated claims-whether the bad motive
is that of the lawyer or of the client-are also factually or legally frivolous. A motive restriction, however, is not necessary to curb frivolous
lawsuits.
Model Rule 3.1 and its comment prove this point. The text of the
black letter rule bars an attorney from filing claims that are objectively
frivolous. That rule is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state
interest. However, the official comment to the rule broadens the prohibition. It adds the case where the client intends primarily to harass or injure
the opponent. Since the rule otherwise bars claims that lack factual and
legal merit, the only additional effect of the comment provision is to
punish claims that are not frivolous. In short, Model Rule 3.1, when
interpreted as instructed by the official comment, is not narrowly tailored
to achieve the aim of deterring objectively baseless claims.
The analysis returns to the first "interest" prong of strict scrutiny:
does the government have any direct interest in restricting a plaintiff's or
his lawyer's motive in the filing of winning claims (other than deterrence
of baseless claims)? One possibility is the interest in avoiding abuse of
the litigation process other than the filing of frivolous claims. This is
similar to but distinct from the prior interest. Even meritorious litigation
can inflict harm. If harm is all that plaintiff desires, the state has some
interest in avoiding that harm. Indeed, both DR 7-102 speaks directly to
such malicious injury. A prohibition against using courts as a weapon
maintains the integrity of courts and protects citizens from this type of
harm. Is this interest sufficient to justify restriction of winning claims?
Because the analysis varies depending on whose motive is at issue, I
will focus first on the client's intent to abuse the system. Winning claims,
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even if a plaintiff files them to injure another, do not present the type or
degree of harm presented by frivolous claims. Other plaintiffs will suffer
little by their filing. These claims are a small minority.of all total claims
and present little risk of consuming court resources to the exclusion of
other plaintiffs. The defendant certainly suffers when the plaintiff strives
to use the process of litigation as a weapon, but it is a harm that the
defendant has to suffer any time a plaintiff gains access to court.
Plaintiff's ill motive does not by itself add any specific harm to the defendant, other than the emotional harm if he knows the plaintiff's ill feelings. The taxpayers pay a cost, as they do with every claim, but they also
get the benefits arising from the filing of a winning claim: advancement
in the law and a cure of wrongdoing by the defendant or by others. In
short, the state does not have a compelling interest in avoiding the filing
of any winning claim, even if the plaintiff's motive is to harm the defendant through its filing.
By contrast, the government may have a compelling interest in imposing a comparable restriction on the lawyer's motive. The government
has the same interests in such a rule as it does in a ban on the client's
motive, but regulation of the lawyer's motive serves an additional interest: protection of the lawyer's client, the plaintiff himself. A lawyer who
is motivated by his own ill motives may put his interests above those of
the client. His judgment may be impaired. Moreover, a ban on lawyer
motive would have minimal effect on the client's right of access. The
client could find another lawyer with a pure motive. Thus, a rule restricting the lawyer's motive likely could survive strict scrutiny. The problem
with the professional rules, as currently written, is that they do not speak
solely to attorney motive. The rules arguably include client motive and
thus fail the second prong of strict scrutiny.'"
Finally, perhaps the most obvious aim of the motive regulation in
the Rules of Conduct is the professionalism of the plaintiff's lawyer. The
government has an interest in maintaining the integrity of and public
confidence in the legal profession by not allowing lawyers to act with
spite, ill will or other bad motive, whether that bad motive is their own
or that of their client. The Court's group litigation cases of the 1960s,
beginning with Button, give some guidance on assessing these interests.
In those cases, the states sought to use their professional regulations,
those barring solicitation and conflicts of interests, to stop the NAACP

186. Another view of this deficiency is that the rules are overbroad in that they
regulate both the motive of the lawyer and that of the client.
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and labor unions from encouraging and sponsoring litigation among its
members." 7 The solicitation and conflicts laws at issue in the group litigation cases-indeed most professional regulations-aimed to avoid both
activity that actually harms clients and the appearance of lawyer impropriety.'" As the Court explained in United Mine Workers of America,
these dangers were too remote to justify their significant intrusion into
First Amendment rights:
[In Button], we held that dangers of baseless litigation and conflicting
interest between the association and individual litigants far to
speculative to justify the broad remedy invoked by the state, a remedy that would have seriously crippled the efforts of the NAACP to
vindicate the rights of its members in court. Likewise in the
Trainmen case there was a theoretical possibility that the unions
interests would diverge from that of the individual litigant members,
and there was a further possibility that if this divergence ever occurred, the union's power to cut off the attorney's referral business
could induce the attorney to sacrifice the interest of his client. Again
we ruled that this very distant possibility of harm could not justify a
complete prohibition of the Trainmen's efforts to aid one another in
assuring that each injured member would be justly compensated for
his injuries.

The decree at issue here thus substantially impairs the associational

187. See supra at notes 79-88.
188. The reputation of the profession was a primary concern of early ethics codes
and of the 1908 ABA Canons. See supra at notes 21-47. This concern carried over
to the more recent model standards, albeit, with less emphasis. For example, the
ninth and final Canon of the 1970 Model Code stated that "a lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of professional impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBLITY, Canon 9 (1970). The new Model Rules format focuses more on enforceable, concrete rules, the Model Rules still cite professional integrity concerns as
one of the driving forces behind the rules. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preface. In addition, some rules, such as those addressing conflicts
of interest, are precautionary and seek to avoid the potential problems of conflicts,
not just their current and actual harm. See generally id. Rules 1.7 through 1.12. See
also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERINO,
§ 1.7.01 at 224-25 ("Since the modem approach takes into account reasonable fears
that improper lawyer behaviors 'may' develop, it has an historical kinship with the
old method of judging conflicts of interest on the basis of 'the appearance of impropriety."').
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rights of the Mine Workers and is not needed to protect the State's

interest in high standard of legal ethics."s
The motive rules at issue here also seek to avoid the appearance of
lawyer impropriety.1" The rules achieve this aim through two different
applications. First, reputation of an attorney can be damaged by the ill
motive of his client in that the lawyer is the representative of a meanspirited person and is facilitating that person's ill intentions. But this
connection is weak when applied to the narrow scenario at issue-a lawyer who personally has pure motives and who files a winning claim. The
probability is low that a lawyer will damage his own reputation or that of
the profession as a whole by taking such an action, or, in terms of Button
and United Mine Workers of America, the danger is too remote and speculative.
The better argument goes to the second application of the professional rules on motive-limiting the ill motives of the lawyer. When the
lawyer's own motives are impure, the effect on his own reputation is
direct and the impact on the profession is great. More importantly, as I
discuss above, such a lawyer is a danger to his client. However, the professional rules as currently written do not speak solely to the lawyer's
motives. They thus fail because they are not narrowly tailored to achieve
the arguably compelling governmental aims of protecting the client and
the reputation of the legal profession. In sum, the rules-as they are now
stated in the codes of conduct-do not pass strict scrutiny and
impermissibly infringe on the client's First Amendment right to petition
courts.
3. Breathing Room Balancing Analysis of Motive Restrictions on
Non-winning Claims.-The next and final step is to analyze the rules
under the breathing room doctrine. This is not an alternative to strict
scrutiny. Rather, this doctrine assumes that the rules would be re-written
to avoid the problem under strict scrutiny-they do not directly apply to

189. 389 U.S. at 223, 225.
190. In addition, the motive rules, like the rules at issue in Button and United
Mine Workers of America, seek to avoid the many actual dangers of frivolous litigation. The connection between a motive rule and deterrence of baseless litigation may
be more direct than that of the anti-solicitation or conflicts rules (i.e., most motive
rules directly address litigation and likely will encompass more frivolous cases than
the other rules). Nevertheless, as I discuss above, a motive prohibition is not narrowly tailored to address claims that lack legal and factual merit.
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the client's motive in filing winning claims. 9' I use two hypothetical
variations on the rules-one in which the rules are re-written to apply to
the filing of suits other than winning claims, and another in which the
rules apply only to civil papers that do not state claims for relief (e.g.,
motions, defensive pleadings and discovery papers). The question for
both is whether these rules would have an undue chilling effect on the
right to file winning claims. In both, I assume that the rule would speak
to the client's motive and would bar lawyer assistance if the client had
the specified ill intent.' I contend that such a motive restriction on the
ability to file meritorious (but losing) claims would have a undue effect
on the exercise of the core right to file winning claims and would therefore violate the First Amendment. However, a motive rule limited to civil
papers other than claims for relief would not have such an effect and survive First Amendment scrutiny.
a.

Rules Limiting Motive in Filing Non-winning Claims for
Relief

Even if a regulation such as DR 7-102(A) were re-written to restrict
only losing claims (and thereby avoid direct regulation of the core right),
it nevertheless would have an undue chilling effect on the right to file
winning claims. Although breathing room analysis requires an examination both of the rule's effect on exercise of the core right and of the
governmental interests behind the rule, the analysis here is principally one
of effect. The hypothesized revised rule would tell the plaintiffs lawyer
that he cannot file a losing claim if his client's purpose is to maliciously
injure or harass (he could file a similarly motivated winning claim).
Where the client has such improper motives, the lawyer must determine
whether the claim will win or lose. This is impossible. The lawyer cannot
possibly know before filing the complaint whether the claim will prevail. "93
' That result turns on many factors, such as the scope and out191. To be sure, the rules now address litigation activity beyond the filing of
winning claims-losing claims and other civil papers-but this application does not
save them. Because their impact on winning claims is substantial-the lawyer cannot
file winning claims if the motive is improper--the rules would be invalid under the
overbreadth doctrine. See supra at notes 163-65 (discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
192. For the reasons stated in the preceding discussion of strict scrutiny, the rules
may bar the lawyer from doing any of these activities for his own personal ill motives.
193. For these reasons, no rule could restrict the filing of losing but meritorious
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come of discovery, that are unascertainable when the complaint is filed.
Thus, whenever the client's motive is impure, this rule requires the lawyer to not file the claim, even if that claim might have been a winning
claim.
Such a rule raises at least some of the problems of a prior restraint.
To be sure, the disciplinary bodies will not assess professional discipline
at such an early stage (i.e., they will not disbar the lawyer to prevent him
from filing the particular suit). But the rules are meant to govern lawyer
behavior in the first instance. They tell lawyers that if they are ethical,
they must refrain from certain actions. Since the lawyer cannot know for
sure which claims are winners or losers, this necessarily would force the
"ethical" lawyer to not file some claims that could prevail. Thus, the
lawyer may himself act as the restraint on the client, and in doing so, the
lawyer in some cases will deny the client a core right under the First
Amendment-the right to file a winning claim, regardless of motive.
To be sure, some, perhaps most lawyers, would not read such rules
to prohibit the filing of a winning claim. They might be optimistic and go
ahead and file strong claims. Under the proposed rule, the state could not
punish any lawyer who in fact won the suit. But this does not save the
rules. The proposed rule still would chill the highly ethical lawyer.
The arguments that I outline above go to the degree of chilling effect that the Professional Rules have on the filing of winning claims-a
profound effect. The next step of breathing room analysis ordinarily is to
balance the governmental interests behind the core activity against that in
regulating the non-protected activity. That step is essentially moot here.
The government has some interest in stopping general ill motives through
its court access rules-the integrity of the process and attorney professionalism interests that I discuss Section III (b)( 11) under strict scrutiny.
However, these interests fail to justify the significant intrusion of the core
right protected by the Petition Clause. The effect of these rules is to stop,
not just deter, the filing of winning claims, if improperly motivated. It is
not a case where a person might risk the possibility of subsequent punishment in the form of civil damages. Instead, the rules aim to stop the

claims, whether in a motive restriction or otherwise. By contrast, the rules could
restrict motive in filing frivolous claims. In this case, compliance is not impossible.
The plaintiff's lawyer can use objective criteria to distinguish between baseless and
meritorious claims, especially those that are strong enough to win. Moreover, the
government's interest in stopping frivolous claims is compelling. See discussion supra
at note 185.
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plaintiff from ever filing any claim in the first place. The effect therefore
is undue, and the rule is invalid.
b.

Rules Limiting Motive In Filing Civil Papers Other Than
the Initial Complaint

The next question is whether the rules may limit the client's motive
in filing other papers in civil litigation.' As I discuss in Part A of this
Section, the core right under the Petition Clause, as I define it, does not
include the right to file these other papers. I argue elsewhere that the
reasonableness standards of due process, not the higher protections of the
First Amendment, govern the propriety of rules regulating civil papers
other than the initial complaint. 9 ' However, because rules regulating the
processing of claims are on the periphery of protected activity, they might
have some impact on the initial filing of a winning claim. Whether this
effect is undue is a question under the First Amendment breathing room
standards.'"
The first step is identification of the effect. How, if at all, does a
rule regulating whether a lawyer may file a motion impact the initial
filing of a winning claim? At first it would seem that such a rule would
have no impact because it regulates only subsequent conduct. Yet, the
rule very well could influence the initial decision to file. If a client has an
ill motive in filing the suit in the first place, he likely will have a similar
motive with regard to the later processing of the suit. Indeed, if the
client's original purpose in bringing the suit was improper, the client
likely will not have a "good" motive in filing any paper that advances
that suit. If this were the case, the Professional Rules would tell the lawyer that although he could file the suit (assuming that the rules were rewritten to avoid application to claims for relief), he could not file any

194. Indeed, the primary impact of rules, such as Model Rule 3.2 and 4.4 (as the
latter rule is applied to civil litigation), is to limit the motive with which a lawyer
files papers other than the initial complaint (winning or losing). They speak to delay
of litigation and harassment of third parties, respectively, and therefore rarely will
apply to the filing of initial claims. See discussion supra, at § I(B).
195. See supra notes 120-23; see also Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra
note 7, at § I(b)(2).
196. The result likely will be the same under either a due process reasonableness
analysis and the balancing test of breathing room analysis. Both are lesser standards
of review than strict scrutiny and both look to reasonableness issues (the breathing
room doctrine looks to whether any chilling effect is "undue").
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subsequent papers. This would tie the hands of the lawyer and may
prompt an ethical lawyer to decline the representation.
Although such a motive restriction can have a chilling effect in these
circumstances, its effect on initial access is less than other possible proscriptions. A lawyer could still assist the client in exercising his First
Amendment right of access (preparing and filing the complaint), but he
could not help him later harass or injure the defendant. The client might
elect to take this limited help and then represent himself in subsequent
proceedings. Or, he might take the initial complaint filing as good
enough. He has publicly aired his views and told the government of his
problems."'
The next question is whether the lesser chilling effect of a motive
restriction on subsequent papers is justified by the dangers that such a
rule aims to avoid. This requires a balancing of interests. The governmental interests behind such a rule generally mirror those of a ban on filing
claims for improper purposes-avoidance of the societal and personal costs
and harms associated with baseless filings, preserving the integrity of the
judicial system and maintaining the reputation of the legal profession.
These are strong governmental interests even though they are not sufficient to justify a direct ban on the filing of winning claims (under strict
scrutiny of the current motive restrictions, as I discuss in Section
III(B)(3)) or a near total chilling effect on the filing of a winning claim
(under a breathing room analysis of a motive restriction on losing claims,
as I discuss in Section llI(B)(3)(a)). In this analysis, however, the interests need not be compelling or narrowly connected to the regulation at
issue - they only need to be sufficient to justify their deterrent effect.
This is more akin to a reasonableness analysis. That difference alone may
argue for upholding a revised set of motive restrictions, applicable only to
subsequent papers.

197. By contrast an absolute ban on filing any form of subsequent papers would
unduly deter filing of an initial claim. The initial filing would be futile if the plaintiff could do nothing, under any circumstances, to obtain resolution. Such a ban
would not give enough breathing room to filing the initial complaint and would be
invalid under the Petition Clause. This conclusion corresponds to the position of
legal scholars who advocate that the right to petition includes some duty of the government in response. See supra note 118 and Andrews, A Right of Court Access, supra note 7, at notes 268-83. The distinction is that I recognize this minimal duty

not as part of the core right but instead mandated by the breathing room doctrine
and contend that it is a question of balancing of interests rather than the higher
standard ordinarily afforded core activity under First Amendment.
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Moreover, the interest in preserving free motion practice is far less
than that in preserving initial access to court to present a claim for relief.
A meritorious complaint, even if it is not ultimately successful, serves
important interests. It can inform the government of societal problems, it
can advance the state of the law, and it provides the opportunity for
peaceful resolution of disputes. These aims cannot be achieved unless the
litigant files his claim. By contrast, most individual motions, or other
litigation steps, are not essential to the claim.'" Today's systems of procedure provide almost endless possibilities for motions, hearing and discovery. The claim may be resolved in any number of ways. Thus, the
interest in preserving any single motion is less than protecting the initial
claim.
Moreover, a motion or other litigation paper actually can undermine
the societal interests behind court access. A motion may be well-founded
in law and in fact but nevertheless detract from resolution of the dispute.
Take, for example, the case where the plaintiff makes an error in serving
the defendant but despite this error the defendant timely receives the
complaint and summons."9 The defendant files a motion to dismiss for
improper service solely because he wants to harass the plaintiff and delay
the litigation. The motion itself would be meritorious in that it has legal
and factual merit, but its purpose would run afoul of the professional
rules and a lawyer could not file it. The motion might advance the law
concerning service, but it would detract from the goal of resolving the
underlying dispute. It does not fully serve the aims of the Petition Clause.
Indeed, a rule that would prevent a lawyer from filing such a motion for
the defendant would promote the aims of the Petition Clause; the plaintiff
198. The procedural step of the answer may be the one civil paper that is essential in that it states the position of the defendant. However, the defendant's ability to
file a civil pleading is not relevant to the question at hand, whether the regulation
will unduly chill the plaintiff's access to court. That a defendant may be barred
from responding would encourage, not discourage, plaintiff's resort to court. Of
course, due process demands that defendant have a reasonable opportunity to be
heard in response to the claim. See supra note 120 (discussing due process standards).
199. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, for example, allows service on the defendant by giving the complaint to a person of suitable age and discretion living at
the usual abode of the defendant. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). Suppose that the process
server gave the complaint and summons to defendant's 4-year old daughter and that
she dutifully gave the papers to her father when he returned home. This service
would be improper under Rule 4, but defendant nevertheless received the same quality of service had the process server given the papers to defendant personally.
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would have more incentive to file suit if he knew that the defendant
would be barred from such harassing tactics.
This danger of abusive motions is not limited to papers filed by the
defendant. Although defendants are usually the party with the most incentive for delay, plaintiffs may have similar delay motives or desire to harass. Plaintiffs, like defendants, can achieve these ill aims with wellfounded motions or other papers. An obvious opportunity for such abuse
is in discovery. A plaintiff might file otherwise legitimate discovery (asking for relevant material that might lead to admissible evidence)," not
for the purpose of advancing resolution of the case, but instead for the
sole purpose of harassing the defendant or embarrassing a third party.
Here, the civil paper, though meritorious under the rules of procedure,
would slow the case and not necessarily advance ultimate resolution of
the case.
In short, the balance of interests is different for motions than for
initial claims. Motions have less justification and more danger of abuse.
Accordingly, a Professional Rule that restricts lawyer assistance in presenting subsequent litigation papers, where the client has ill motives,
survives breathing room analysis. It does not unduly chill access to court.
V.

CONCLUSION

The right of access to court is a fundamental right under the Petition
Clause of the First Amendment. Although the right is relatively undeveloped, the petition right would seem to protect clients from a Rule of Professional Conduct that would bar, based solely on the client's motive,
lawyer assistance in presenting meritorious claims. To the extent that
such a rule would bar core activity under the Petition Clause-the filing of
a winning claim-it would fail strict scrutiny. To the extent that the rule
would prohibit claims that are meritorious but losing, the rule fails because it does not give sufficient breathing room to the core right of filing
winning claims.
This means that the states and the American Bar Association must
clarify the current rules: DR 7-102(A) of the Model Code and Model
Rules 3.1, 3.2 and 4.4 of the Model Rules format. To be sure, one might
more narrowly construe each of these rules, as currently written, so as to

200. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (setting forth the general standards and scope of
civil discovery in federal court).
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avoid a direct collision with the Petition Clause. However, the First
Amendment demands more precision in rules that touch upon First
Amendment rights. Because the rules have the potential to limit protected
access to court, the states must revise the rules, or at a minimum, the
official comments interpreting the rules.2' I suggest the following:
Model Rule 3.1. The text of the black letter rule, the duty to present
meritorious claims and contentions, itself does not run afoul of the
Petition Clause. Its literal terms use an objective merits ("frivolous")
criteria and do not impose a motive restriction on court access.'
The problem is in the official comment; it equates improper motive
with "frivolous." Simply deleting this sentence likely would suffice,
but the better approach, given the historical presence of this comment, would be to affirmatively clarify the rule. A simple sentence in
the comment stating that the rule does not limit the filing of an otherwise meritorious claim, even if the client has an improper motive
for filing, would end the confusion.
If the rulemakers want to retain the permissible motive elements
the reform is more complicated. This is a question of policy. Under
the Petition Clause the rules could continue to ban a lawyer from
acting from his own ill motives, but such prohibition arguably is
better addressed by the rules prohibiting conflicts of interests.'
The rules also could retain a motive prohibition on motions and civil
papers other than claims for relief. Although I do not necessarily
support such a rule, as a matter of policy and practice, if that is the
state's choice, I would propose adding to the rule a second paragraph
to specifically bar a lawyer from assisting a client who has an "improper purpose" in filing papers other than claims for relief. Finally,

201. A clarification in an ABA ethics opinion will not suffice. Those opinions are
too removed from the source of the problem--the rules and their official commentary. Moreover, ABA opinions are only advisory, and have no direct impact on the
state codes of conduct. For a discussion of the impact and influence of ABA opinions. See Laurence K. Hellman, "When Ethics Rules" Don't Mean What They Say:
The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 317
(1996).
202. An objective merits standard for claims is permissible under the Petition
Clause. As I discuss supra in Section III(B)(3) and at note 193, a law barring frivolous claims would serve compelling state interests and would have negligible impact
on the client's ability to file winning claims.
203. Model Rule 1.7(b), for example, bars a lawyer from representing a client
where his own interests might materially limit his responsibilities to the client and
adversely affect the representation. MODEL RuLEs oF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, Rule

1.7(b).

The Journal of the Legal Profession

[Vol. 24:13

the rule could include a restriction on the client's motive as to frivolous claims,' but such a rule would weaken the rule. It would bar
only baseless claims that are filed to achieve the client's purpose of
harassing the defendant, rather than punishing all baseless claims regardless of intent.
Model Code DR 7-102(A). Reform of this rule may be more problematic. The ABA already has reformed the rule by adopting Model
Rule 3.1 in 1983. In the states that still use the Model Code format,
the easiest solution would be to replace DR 7-102(A) with Model
Rule 3.1 (assuming that the official comment is modified as I propose above). However, some states, such as Alabama, have kept the
old rule even despite adoption of the Model Rule format. The intention in these states might be to retain a motive prohibition or to
retain the harassment effect standard. If this is the state's policy, then
simple adoption of the Model Rule will not achieve that governmental purpose. To achieve the first aim-a motive limit on subsequent
litigation papers (everything but claims for relief)-the state could
adopt Model Rule 3.1 with the second paragraph as I discuss above.
If the state's aim is to achieve the second aim (an effect standard), then the reform is more complicated. An effect standard may
not pass First Amendment scrutiny to the extent that it limits the
filing of claims for relief, for much of the same reasons that a motive
restriction fails. Because a defendant feels harassed or burdened in
all litigation, such a rule would severely restrict court access to file
winning claims. An additional problem with an effect rule, as applied
to the filing of claims, is that it does not give clear notice of the
prohibited activity. The litigant and lawyer must guess as to whether
the other party will feel harassed or maliciously injured. The Court
has been hostile to such tests when applied to limit First Amendment
freedoms.' However, an effect test may survive First Amendment
scrutiny to the extent that it applies to conduct other than the filing

204. See supra note 193.
205. The standard renders the rule vague, the litigant will not have sufficient basis
to assess whether the conduct is permissible. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (invalidating as unconstitutionally vague an ordinance that
outlawed assemblies of three or more persons on sidewalks where such assembly was
"annoying" to passers-by: "[clonduct that annoys some people does not annoy others"); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 111 (noting that an antipicketing ordinance that outlawed noise that "tends to disturb" was troubling and
presented a close question as to vagueness, absent the state court's narrowing construction).
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of claims for relief. In this is the aim, rulemakers should consider
putting a clearly stated effect test (as opposed to the current wording)
in a separate paragraph addressing only civil papers that do not state
claims for relief.
Model Rule 3.2. This rule, the duty to expedite litigation, in most of
its foreseeable applications does not present a problem under the
Petition Clause. It rarely applies to the filing of complaints-only
where a plaintiff deliberately frames and files his complaint to cause
delay. Therefore, the Petition Clause likely does not mandate change
to the black letter rule. Instead, a sentence in the comments clarifying
that the rule does not apply to the filing of a claim for relief will
eliminate any ambiguity and avoid any potential clash with the First
Amendment.
Model Rule 4.4. The same analysis applies to Model Rule 4.4, the
duty to respect third parties. The rule is not addressed to litigation,
and even to the extent that its prohibition against harassing third
parties would apply to litigation conduct, the rule would apply rarely
to claims for relief. Therefore, a clarification in the comments should
suffice.
In sum, unlike the Professional Rules that regulate lawyer speech, these
rules require only minor modification to conform to the First Amendment. Nevertheless, the ABA and state rulemakers must take heed of the
client's right to court access and avoid any possible interpretation of the
Professional Rules that would violate the Petition Clause. The right of
court access is too precious: it is the starting point of justice.

